Mutual Authentication Protocols for RFID Systems by Omer, Asrar Ahmed
   MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS  




   By 
   ASRAR AHMED OMER 
   Masters of Science in Computer Science  
   Oklahoma State University 
   Tulsa, Oklahoma 
   2007 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   MASTER OF SCIENCE 
   December, 2007  
 ii 
   MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
 FOR  





   Thesis Approved: 
 
 
   Dr. Johnson Thomas  
   Thesis Adviser 
 
   Dr Istvan Joyner 
 
   Dr. Debao Chen 
 
  Dr. A. Gordon Emslie 






I would like to thank all my committee members who helped me in completing 
my thesis. Specially, Dr Johnson Thomas, who was my inspiration, he helped me in every 
step of the way. I like to personally thank him for all of his guidance and help. 
 I would like to thank all my friends specially Mustafa Hilal Qureshi and ER Sabri 
who helped me keep up my morale and gave me lot of good memories.   
 I would like to thank from the bottom of my heart my brother Masroor Ahmad for 
his support and help to reach this goal. I would like to thank my beloved parents Mr. 
Mehboob Ahmed (Late) and Mrs. Khalida Mehboob for all their support, help and 
prayers.   
 In the end I would like to thank ALLAH for giving me the patience and guidance 
that was needed to complete my research.  
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
1. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 
 
 1.1 RFID Overview..................................................................................................1 
 1.2 RFID Components .............................................................................................3 
1.2.1 Transponder or RFID Tag.........................................................................4 
1.2.2 Transceiver or RFID Reader.....................................................................5 
1.2.3 Back-end Servers (or Back-end Databases)..............................................6 
1.2.4 Operating Frequencies ..............................................................................6 
 1.3 Advantages of RFID System .............................................................................7 
 1.4 Terminology and Basic Definitions ...................................................................8 
 1.4.1 RFID System.............................................................................................8 
 1.4.2 Symmetric-Key Cryptography..................................................................8 
 1.4.3 Asymmetric-Key Cryptography................................................................8 
 1.4.4 Authentication...........................................................................................9 
 1.4.5 Challenge-response Protocol ....................................................................9 
 1.4.6 Hash Function .........................................................................................10 
 1.4.7 Random Number Generator....................................................................11 
 1.4.8 Pseudo Random Functions......................................................................11 
 
2. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES ...................................................................14 
 
 2.1 Security Issues .................................................................................................14 
 2.2 Privacy Issues...................................................................................................14 
 2.3 Security Considerations ...................................................................................15 
 2.3.1 Confidentiality ........................................................................................15 
 2.3.2 Authenticity.............................................................................................15 
 2.3.3 Availability .............................................................................................16 
 2.3.4 Anonymity ..............................................................................................16 
 2.3.5 Integrity...................................................................................................16 
 2.3.6 Indistinguishability .................................................................................17 
2.3.7 Forward Security.....................................................................................17 
2.4 Risks and Threats.............................................................................................17 
2.4.1 Physical Attacks......................................................................................17 
2.4.2 Denial of Service (DoS Attack) ..............................................................17 




Chapter          Page 
 
2.4.6 Database Desynchronization...................................................................18 
2.4.7 Traffic Analysis ......................................................................................18 
2.5 RFID Standards................................................................................................18 
2.5.1 Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards ......................................................19 
2.5.2 RFID in Animals.....................................................................................20 
2.5.3 Item Management ...................................................................................20 
2.5.4 Near-Field Communication (NFC) .........................................................20 
2.5.5 Electronic Product Code (EPC) ..............................................................21 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................23 
 
 3.1 Privacy Protection Approaches........................................................................23 
 3.1.1 Kill Command.........................................................................................23 
3.1.2 Faraday Cage ..........................................................................................23 
3.1.3 Active Jamming ......................................................................................23 
3.1.4 Blocker Tag.............................................................................................24 
 3.2 Bill of Rights....................................................................................................24 
 3.3 Security Protection Approaches.......................................................................25 
3.3.1 Non-Cryptographic Primitives................................................................25 
3.3.1.1 Key Permutation ............................................................................25 
3.3.2 Hash Functions Schemes ........................................................................26 
3.3.2.1 Hash-Lock Scheme ........................................................................26 
3.3.2.2 Extended Hash-Lock Scheme........................................................27 
3.3.2.3 Hash-based Varying Identifier .......................................................29 
3.3.2.4 Hash Chain-based Scheme.............................................................30 
3.3.2.5 Mutual Authentication Scheme based on Synchronized Secret ....31 
 
4. PROBLEM STATEMENT......................................................................................33 
 
5. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY.............................................................................36 
 
 5.1 Protocol 1 .........................................................................................................37 
5.1.1 Assumptions............................................................................................37 
5.1.2 Authentication.........................................................................................37 
 5. 2 Protocol 2 ........................................................................................................42 
 5.2.1 Assumptions............................................................................................42 
 5.2.2 Authentication.........................................................................................42 
 5.3 Protocol 3 .........................................................................................................46 
 5.3.1 Assumptions............................................................................................46 
 5.3.2 Authentication.........................................................................................46 
 5.4 Protocol 4 .........................................................................................................50 
5.4.1 Assumptions............................................................................................50 
 5.4.2 Authentication.........................................................................................50 
5.5 Protocol 5 .........................................................................................................55 
 vi 





6. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
 6.1 Security Analysis of Protocol 1 .......................................................................60 
 6.2 Security Analysis of Protocol 2 .......................................................................64 
 6.3 Security Analysis of Protocol 3 .......................................................................67 
 6.4 Security Analysis of Protocol 4 .......................................................................70 
 6.5 Security Analysis of Protocol 5 .......................................................................74 
  
7. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
 7.1 Performance Analysis of Protocol 1 ................................................................79 
 7.2 Performance Analysis of Protocol 2 ................................................................80 
 7.3 Performance Analysis of Protocol 3 ................................................................81 
 7.4 Performance Analysis of Protocol 4 ................................................................81 
 7.5 Performance Analysis of Protocol 5 ................................................................82 
 
8. APPLICATION OF PROPOSED SECURO RFID PROTOCOL...........................85 
 
 8.1 Supply Chain Application................................................................................86 
8.1.1 System Model .........................................................................................87 
8.1.2 System Setup...........................................................................................87 
8.1.2.1 Tag Initialization............................................................................88 
8.1.2.2 Database Initialization ...................................................................88 
8.1.2.3 RFID Read/Write Protocol ............................................................89 
8.1.3 Security Requirements in Supply Chain .................................................90 
8.1.3.1 Visibility ........................................................................................90 
8.1.3.2 Authoritative Access......................................................................90 
8.1.3.3 Authenticity of Tags ......................................................................91 
8.1.3.4 Unlinkablility .................................................................................91 
  










LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table           Page 
 
   1. Tag Classification ..................................................................................................4 
   2. Frequency Classification ........................................................................................7 
   3. Core Comparison .................................................................................................35 
   4. Comparison of Security Requirements between Proposed Protocols ..................77 
   5. Comparison of Security Requirements with Other Protocols ..............................78 
   6. Computational Loads and Memory Requirement for Proposed Protocols ..........83 
   7. Comparison of Computational Load and Memory Requirement 




LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure           Page 
 
   1.1 RFID System.........................................................................................................3 
   1.2 A Philips 1. Code RFID Tag.................................................................................5 
   1.3 A Pseudo Random Function (PRF).....................................................................12 
   2.0 RFID technology standards and frequency bands ..............................................19 
   3.1 Steps 1 – 4 of VB protocol 1...............................................................................26 
   3.2 Hash-Locking: A reader unlocks a hash-locked tag. ..........................................27 
   3.3 Randomized Hash-Locking: A reader unlocks a tag 
           whose ID is k in the randomized hash-lock scheme .........................................28 
   3.4 Hash-based Enhancement using Varying Identifiers ..........................................30 
   3.5 Hash Chain Scheme ............................................................................................31 
   5.1 Protocol 1 (PRNG on Reader Side) ....................................................................41 
   5.2 Protocol 2 (PRNG on Reader and Tag Side) ......................................................45 
   5.3 Protocol 3 (PRNG on Reader Side and Updating after Authentication) ...........49 
   5.4 Pseudo Random Seed production from Master Key ..........................................50 
   5.5 Creating Message α from PRF  ..........................................................................51 
   5.6 Creating Message β from PRF  ..........................................................................53 
   5.7 Protocol 4 (Using Tag Master Key) ...................................................................54 
   5.8 Creating Message α from PRF  ..........................................................................56 
   5.9 Creating Message β from PRF  ..........................................................................57 
 ix
Figure           Page 
 
   5.10 Protocol 5 (Using Universal Master Key) .......................................................59 
   8.1 Networked RFID Systems .................................................................................85 




C Counter value 
DoS Denial of service attack 
fk (x) Pseudo-random function with x as variable and k as secret seed 
ID static identification number  
K Master key 
K1 first associated key value 
K2 second associated key value 
K1last first associated key value used at last attempt 
K2last second associated key value used at last attempt 
n pseudo-random number  
n' pseudo-random number generated by attacker 
PRF Pseudo-random function 
PRNG Pseudo-random number generator 
TIN tag-index number 








1.1 RFID Overview 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a type of automatic identification 
system. The purpose of an RFID system is to enable data to be transmitted to a portable 
device, called a tag, which is read by an RFID reader and processed according to the 
needs of a particular application. The data transmitted by the tag may provide 
identification or location information or specifics about the product tagged, such as price, 
color, date of purchase, etc. RFID aims to identify objects remotely, with neither physical 
nor visual contact. 
RFID system consists of three components: 
1. An antenna or coil 
2. A transceiver (with decoder) 
3. A transponder (RF tag) electronically programmed with unique 
information. 
The antenna emits radio signals to activate the tag and read and write data to it. 
Antennas are the conduits between the tag and the transceiver, which controls the 
system’s data acquisition and communication. When an RFID tag passes through the 
electromagnetic zone, it detects the reader’s activation signal. The reader decodes the
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data encoded in the tag’s integrated circuit (silicon chip) and the data is passed to the host 
computer for processing. 
The use of RFID is tracking applications first appeared during the 1980’s even 
though RFID was developed by allied forces in WWII so radar operators could 
distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft [16]. RFID systems have also been used 
for a few years in commercial applications, for example in contact-less smart cards used 
on public transport. However, the boom that RFID technology enjoys today is chiefly due 
to the standardization and development of low-cost devices, so-called tags. This new 
generation of RFID tags has opened the door to various applications. For example in 
supply chains, to locate people, to combat the counterfeiting of expensive items, to trace 
livestock, to label books in libraries, etc. 
However, theses tags also bring with them security and privacy issues. Security 
issues rely on classic attacks, e.g., denial of service, traffic analysis, spoofing, 
impersonation of tags or channel eavesdropping. These attacks are rendered more 
practicable because of the tag’s lack of computational and storage capacity. 
RFID raises issues linked to privacy, in particular the problem of traceability of 
objects and thus indirectly of people. RFID tags would permit everybody to track people 
using only low-cost equipment. This is strengthened by the fact that tags can not be 
switched off, they can be easily hidden, their lifespan is not limited, and analyzing the 
collected data can be efficiently automated. RFID tags can be attached without 
knowledge of consumer and this is major concern for privacy advocacy groups. The 
potential for widespread dissemination, misuse, unauthorized access, and disclosure of 
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personal information about consumers would increase exponentially and will create a 
new source of privacy concern for the public.   
1.2 RFID Components 
RFID system is an information tracking system that consists of wireless tag T, 
wireless reader R, and back-end database, B as shown in Figure 1.1.  
Tag: T is comprised of an IC chip and antenna, and sends information to the RFID reader 
in response to a wireless probe.  
Reader: R is a device that transmits a radio frequency probe signal to T, receives the 
information sent by T, and sends the information to the back-end database, B. 
Back-End: B is a secure server that has a database and manages various types of 
information related to each T, e.g., ID, reader location, read time, and temperature of 
sensor. B resolves the ID of T from the information sent by T through authenticated R.  
 
Figure 1.1: RFID System 
As shown in the above figure when a reader probes a number of tags, it sends 
energy or signal in the form of a radio frequency. Tags on getting the signal energy wake 
up and perform the task within the timeframe given in the clock, as requested by the 
reader.  
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1.2.1 Transponders or RFID Tag:  
Tags may either be actively or passively powered. Active tags contain an on-
board power source, such as a battery, wile passive tags must be inductively powered via 
an RF signal from the reader. Active tags may be read from a greater distance than 
passive tags. Active tags may also record sensor readings or perform calculations in the 
absence of a reader. Passive tags can only operate in the presence of a reader and are 
inactive otherwise.  
Tags are categorized into several types according to their physical characteristics 
and their applications. ISO/IEC categorizes RFID tags into type A and type B according 
to air interface since the characteristics of tags are mostly very different according to used 
radio frequency. On the other hand, EPC Global divides it into six categories, Class 0-1, 
Class 2, Class 3, Class 4 and Class 5 as a defacto standard. Class 0 and 1 are types of 
read only passive identity tags. Class 2 is passive too with additional functionality like 
memory or encryption. Class 3 is semi-passive tags and may support broadband. Class 4 
is type of active tags and may be capable of broadband peer-to-peer communication with 
other active tags in the same frequency band and with readers. Class 5 is active tags and 
can support power Class 0-3 tags and communicate with Class 4 tags and with each other 
wirelessly. Tags can also be classified by their functionality [17]. Table 1 show five 
classes based on functionality defined by MIT Auto-ID Center. 
Table 1: Tag Classification [17] 
Class Nickname Memory Power Source Features 
0 Anti-Shoplift 
Tags 
None Passive Article Surveillance 
1 EPC Read-Only Any Identification Only 
 5 
2 EPC Read-Write Any Data Logging 




4 Smart Dust Read-Write Active Ad Hoc Networking 
 
Universal deployment of RFID systems is nowadays mainly limited due to 
security and privacy concerns along with tag cost. Significant market penetration can be 
expected only if tags are priced below US$0.1 – 0.05 [3]. In this price range, tags come 
with following typical characteristics: 
• Limited storage capacity.  
• Limited computation power. 
• Limited communication capabilities. 
• No temper resistance.  
This price barrier for low-cost tags restricts the range of gates in a tag number 
from 500 – 5000, and the number of gates for security purpose is limited to from 200 - 
2000 [2]. Due to this limit, it is infeasible to use the existing cryptographic algorithms. 
[1].  
 
Figure 1.2: A Philips 1.Code RFID Tag [27] 
1.2.2 Transceivers or RFID Reader: 
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A Reader may contain internal storage, processing power, or an interface to back-
end databases to provide additional functionality. Readers may use tag contents as a look-
up key into a database storing product information, tracking logs, or key management 
data.  
The communication channel between tags and readers is generally considered 
insecure since the channel is based on the air interface. On the other hand, the 
communication channel between readers and back-end servers is considered as a secure 
channel. Readers can be either peripheral or a handheld device depending on the wireless 
network. 
1.2.3 Back-end Servers (or Back-end Databases): 
Back-end servers receive data from readers, enter the data into a database of their 
own, and provide access to the data in a number of forms that are useful to the sponsoring 
organization [17]. The back-end database may also perform functions on behalf of either 
the readers or tags. It is assumed that the communication channel between readers and 
back-end servers is secure channel like the existing VPN or SSL. 
1.2.4 Operating Frequencies: 
RFID tags and readers operate within several distinct frequency ranges, each of 
which is intended for specific application characteristic. According to the application 




Table 2: Frequency Classification [17] 
Devices Bandwidth Typical Frequency Application Example 
Low 30 – 300 
KHz 
125 – 134 KHz Short Range Applications: 
Live stock Identification, 
Antitheft Systems 
High 3 – 30 MHz 13.56 MHz Smart Card, Smart Card 
Label Applications, Baggage 
Tracking, Small Product 
Labeling 
Very High 300 MHz – 
3 GHz 
U.S.A.: 902 -928 MHz or 
2.45 GHz, EU: 865 -868 
MHz or 5.8 GHz, Japan: 
950 – 956 MHz, Korea: 
908.5 – 914 MHz 
Toll Collection Applications 
 
1.3 Advantages of RFID System 
 The automated identification of objects with electromagnetic fields is the major 
purpose of RFID technology. It is expected that this technology will at least partly 
replace optical barcodes in the future. The potential benefits of a pervasive low-cost 
RFID system are enormous. World wide, over 5 billion barcodes are scanned daily [2]. 
The major advantages of RFID systems over optical identification with barcodes are: 
• The operation without line-of-sight. 
• The possibility to rewrite and modify data. 
• The operation without any proper positioning. 
• Tags can be scanned from distance of several meters.  
• Faster than scanning barcodes. 
A significant growth of the RFID market is predicted and a major driver for this 
rate is the falling prices of RFID – transponders.  
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There are various applications for low-cost tags such as logistics, point-of-sale 
checkouts, animal identification, item management in libraries, and waste management. 
More sophisticated RFID tags application includes health care, ticketing, road toll, 
electronic purse, access control for facilities, tracking people, key, RFID passports, anti-
theft device and protection against counterfeiting. These RFID tags have the capability to 
replace magnetic stripe cards and classical contact smartcards.  
Postal and courier mail services are expected to become the second largest market 
for RFD item level tagging following the retail sector.  
1.4 Terminology and Basic Definitions 
 Some of the most commonly used terms are defined below, which will help in 
understanding the RFID system and its security models. 
1.4.1 RFID System: 
Such systems in which wireless devices transmit data and energy via radio 
frequency are called RFID systems. 
1.4.2 Symmetric-Key Cryptography: 
The signer and the verifier share a secret key, whereas the key exchange problem 
is solved between them. A single secret key is used for both encryption and decryption. 
1.4.3 Asymmetric-Key Cryptography: 
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Signer has a pair of cryptographic keys – a public key and a private key. The 
private key is kept secret in the signer’s environment, while the public key is widely 
distributed. A message encrypted with the public key can be decrypted only with the 
corresponding private key.  
1.4.4 Authentication: 
It is assurance of the identity of an entity at the other end of a communication 
channel. The protocol where one entity A is authenticated to entity B is called unilateral 
authentication. If both entities authenticate to each other, it’s called mutual 
authentication.  
1.4.5 Challenge-response Protocol: 
In challenge-response protocols the verifier sends a challenge request to the 
claimant. This challenge can be a randomly chosen number or string which varies from 
one request to the other. The claimant “proves” its identity by manipulating the challenge 
using the secret which is associated with that entity. It is important not to show this secret 
to the verifier during the communication. After receiving the response from the claimant 
the verifier validates the response and can be sure whether the claimant knows the secret.  
One-way Challenge-response Protocol: In this a timestamp mechanism is used. 
The signer A sends the encrypted timestamp tA to the claimant B who decrypts it and 
verifies that the timestamp is acceptable.  
A → B: EK (tA) 
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Two-way Challenge-response Protocol: Its makes use of random numbers. In the 
case of two-way unilateral authentication, the claimant B must first send a random 
number rB to the signer A who encrypts it and sends it back. Verification works by 
decrypting the response and comparing it with the random number sent.  
A← B: rB 
A → B: EK (rB) 
In the case of two-way mutual authentication, the entity A must encrypt the 
timestamp tA and a randomly selected number rA and send it to the second party B. Then, 
the random number rA is encrypted and sent back to the originator who decrypts the 
message and compares the result with the send random number.  
A → B: E K (tA, rA) 
A ← B: E K (rA) 
1.4.6 Hash Function: 
The basic operation of hash functions is to map an element of larger domains to 
an element of smaller domains. This property is utilized in many non-cryptographic 
computer applications like storage allocation to improve performance. The purpose of 
hash functions in the cryptographic sense is to provide data integrity and message 
authentication.  
 A one-way hash function (OWHF) is a function which offers preimage and 
second preimage resistance. A collision resistant hash function CRHF is a function which 
is second preimage resistant and collision-freshness. Hash chain is a variant of hash 
functions and utilized in various areas. 
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1.4.7 Random Number Generator: 
Random number generation is used in a wide variety of cryptographic operations, 
such a key generation and challenge-response protocols. A random number generator is a 
function that outputs a sequence of 0s and 1s such that at any point, the next bit cannot be 
predicted based on the previous bits. However, true random number generation is 
difficult to do on a computer, since computers are deterministic devices. Thus, if the 
same random generator is run twice, identical results are received. True random number 
generators are in use, but they can be difficult to build. They typically take input from 
something in the physical world, such as the rate of neutron emission from a radioactive 
substance or a user’s idle mouse movements. Because of these difficulties, random 
number generation on a computer is usually only pseudo-random number generation. A 
pseudo-random number generator PRNG produces a sequence of bits that has a random 
looking distribution. With each different seed the pseudo-random number generator 
generate a different pseudo-random sequence. With a relatively small random seed a 
pseudo-random generator can produce a long apparently random string. Pseudo-random 
number generators are often based on cryptographic functions like block ciphers or 
stream ciphers.  
1.4.8 Pseudo Random Functions: 
A PRF is a deterministic function f: {0,1}n  {0,1}n which is efficient (i.e. 
computable in polynomial time) and takes two inputs x, k  belongs {0,1}n. We actually 
only consider x to be a variable and let k be a hidden random seed and function index, f 
(x, k) = fk (x). 
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   x             fk (x) 
      
               k 
Figure 1.3: A Pseudo Random Function (PRF) 
 Most of the currently available protocols use hash functions, which are expensive 
in terms of chip cost, thus hindering the widespread use of this system. If we can reduce 
the cost by using simpler approaches than hash functions, the chip cost will be greatly 
reduced. Another problem seen in most protocols is database desynchronization when an 
attacker is able to change the values on either the database or at the tag end. Some attacks 
may even make the tag non-functional. Some protocols even suffer from scalability 
problems as the database has to compute for a particular tag. 
 Our approach uses primitive operations, pseudo-random generator (PRNG) and 
pseudo-random function (PRF), which can greatly reduce the cost. The first three 
protocols use a random number generator. Only one of these uses the PRNG on the tag 
side. Identifying the tag with their numbers (or Tag Identification Number) in the 
database can solve the scalability problem. By saving the previous values of keys in the 
database solves the problem of database desynchronization. 
 This thesis is organized as follows: In chapter 2, we look at the security and 
privacy issues, as well as the risks and threats currently faced by an RFID system. In 
chapter 3, review work done by other scientists and point out some of the deficiencies in 
their protocols. In chapter 4, we present the problem statement, that is, we describe the 
security problems investigated in this thesis. In chapter 5, we propose five new 
lightweight and ultra lightweight protocols for RFID systems. In chapters 6 and 7, we do 
f 
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a security and performance analysis of all the proposed protocols. In chapter 8, we apply 
one of our protocols to a supply chain system. In the final chapter, we provide 





SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES 
2.1 Security Issues 
From the viewpoint of real world applications, the technical design of RFID 
readers and tags involve many risks. Existing RFID systems are vulnerable to many 
security risks and imply potential privacy problems, since it is very hard to implement the 
existing cryptographic algorithms due to the restricted computational power and the 
memory size of low-cost RFID tags. A common technology is used in both retail and 
library applications. Retail tags can be read at ten times the distance (20-30feet) of library 
tags (2-4feet). In addition, retail users of RFID will use the Electronic Product Code 
(EPC), a 96-bit number designed to uniquely label individual items. EPC uses will have 
access to the EPC Discovery Service, an aggregate database of tags collected from 
independent readers. Anyone with access to EPC Discovery can monitor or track the 
movement of a particular RFID-tagged item.  
2.2 Privacy Issues 
User privacy issues are considered as a big barrier to the proliferation of RFID 
system applications since the data of a tag can be transmitted by an illegal interrogation 
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without its bearer’s notification. Two privacy issues are of major concern. One is the data 
leakage illegally from a tag. Another is the malicious tracking for the unique ID of a tag. 
A tag bearer has various objects that they do not want others to know including what they 
currently keep and what those objects are. If the tags are attached to those objects, the 
private information of tag bearers can be revealed regardless of their attention. The 
location privacy of tag bearers can be revealed through the response information from the 
tag although it is securely protected. In a RFID-labeled society, the value for 
commodities or products is mostly identified by the RFID. Thus, simple forgery such as 
copying information of a tag or even more sophisticated measures will be very attractive 
for malicious users and adversaries to disguise or impersonate.  
2.3 Security Considerations 
We consider the following as generally required security properties for RFID 
systems: 
2.3.1 Confidentiality: 
RFID tags must not get involved in processing personal data. In addition to it, 
data stored in a tag should not be gathered to trace the relationship between the tag and 
the tag bearer by illegitimate readers. The private information of a tag must be kept 
secure to guarantee user privacy. The tag information must be meaningless for its bearer 
even though it is eavesdropped by an unauthorized reader. 
2.3.2 Authenticity: 
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The authenticity of a tag is at risk since the unique identifier of a tag can be 
spoofed or manipulated. The tags in general are not tamper resistant. 
2.3.3 Availability: 
Any RFID system can easily be disturbed by frequency jamming. However, 
denial-of-service attacks are also feasible on higher communication layers. The so called 
“RFID Blocker” exploits tag singulation (anti-collision) mechanisms to interrupt the 
communication of a reader with all or with specific tags.  
2.3.4 Anonymity: 
Although a tag’s data is encrypted, the tag’s unique identification information is 
exposed since the encrypted data is constant. An attacker can identify each T with its 
constant encrypted data. Therefore, it is important to make the tag’s information 
anonymous. 
2.3.5 Integrity: 
Integrity in terms of the RFID environment as a security requirement is usually 
for data integrity between entities i.e. tags, readers, and back-end servers. This is due to 
the reason that the communication channel is not fault-tolerable and the data 
synchronization between entities can fail. Thus, integrity among entities must be 
guaranteed and data recovery mechanisms should be provided in case data loss occurs. In 
addition, if a tag’s memory is rewritable, forgery is possible, so integrity for the tag’s 
information also must be guaranteed. 
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2.3.6 Indistinguishability: 
The value emitted by tag should not be such that the attacker can easily identify 
the tag.  
2.3.7 Forward Security: 
If the attacker is able to get the value from the tag, it should not give any past 
details. 
2.4 Risks and Threats 
The main risks and threats an RFID system can suffer are described below. These 
vary from system to system.  
2.4.1 Physical Attacks: 
In order to mount these attacks, it is necessary to manipulate tags physically, 
generally in a laboratory. Some examples of physical attacks are material removal 
through shaped charges or water etching, radiation imprinting, circuit disruption, etc. 
RFID tags offer little or no resilience against these attacks.  
2.4.2 Denial of Service (DoS Attack): 
A common example of this type of attack in RFID systems is the signal jamming 
of RF channels. 
2.4.3 Counterfeiting: 
 18 
These attacks consist of modifying the identity of an item, generally by means of 
tag manipulation. 
2.4.4 Spoofing: 
When an attacker is able to successfully impersonate a legitimate tag as, for 
example, in a man-in-the-middle attack. 
2.4.5 Eavesdropping: 
In this type of attacks, unintended recipients are able to intercept and read 
messages. 
2.4.6 Database Desynchronization: 
If the attacker is able to tamper with the responses from the tag and can create 
desynchronization of values at both tag and backend database.  
2.4.7 Traffic Analysis: 
In this attack, the person intercepts the messages and examines in order to extract 
information from patterns in communication. It can be performed even when the 
messages are encrypted and can not be decrypted. In general, the greater the number of 
messages observed, the more information can be inferred from the traffic. 
2.5 RFID Standards 
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There exists a large variety of RFID systems and their main characteristics are 
defined by standards. Those standards typically describe the physical and the data link 
layers, covering aspects such as the air interface (frequency, coding, and modulations), 
communication protocol, bandwidth, anti-collision and security mechanisms.  
 RFID is a relatively heterogeneous radio technology with a significant number of 
associated standards. Figure 2.0 contains the most relevant technology standards. 
 
Figure 2.0: RFID technology standards and frequency bands [28] 
2.5.1 Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards: 
Contactless integrated circuit cards are special instances of identification cards as 
defined in ISO 7810. There are three types of contactless cards based on their 
communication range. 
• Closed-coupled cards (ISO 10536). They operate at a very short distance to 
the reader (< 1cm). 
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• Proximity cards (ISO 14443). They operate at an approximate distance of 
10cm of the reader. They usually possess a microprocessor and may be 
considered as high-end RFID transponders.  
• Vicinity cards (ISO 15693). These cards have a range of up to 1 meter. They 
usually incorporate inexpensive state machines instead of microprocessors.  
2.5.2 RFID in Animals: 
ISO 11784, 1SO 11785 and ISO 14223 specify tags for animal identification in 
the frequency band below 135 kHz. The original standards defined only a fixed unique 64 
bit identifier, but with the more recent ISO 14223 standard further read/write and write-
protected data blocks are allowed. 
2.5.3 Item Management: 
ISO 18000 defines the air interface, collision detection mechanisms and the 
communication protocol for item tags in different frequency bands. Part 1 describes the 
reference architecture and parts 2 to 7 specify the system in different frequencies bands. 
Part 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 specifies frequency (<134 kHz, 13.56 MHz, 2.45 GHz, 5.8 GHz, 900 
MHz, 433 MHz) tags respectively.  
2.5.4 Near-Field Communication (NFC): 
NFC evolved from the RFID technology and is designed for interactions between 
tags and electronic devices in close proximity (<10cm). NFC is not designed for full 
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networking or transmission of large amounts of data, but should allow a convenient data 
exchange between cheap tags (e.g. smart labels) and electronic devices (e.g. PDA). 
• NFCIP-1: The standards ETSI TS 102.190, ISO 18092 and ECMA 340 define 
identically the Near Field Communication Interface and Protocol. These 
protocols describe the air interface, initialization, collision avoidance, a frame 
format and a block oriented data exchange protocol with error handling. The 
communication modes can be either active or passive.  
• NFCIP-2: The Near Field Communication Interface and Protocol – 2 (NFCIP 
– 2) specifies the communication mode selection mechanism (ECMA 352). 
This protocol deals with the situation that NFCIP-1, ISO 14443 and ISO 
15693 devices all operate at 13.56 MHz, but with different protocols. Its 
specified that NFCIP-2 complaint devices can enter each of these three 
communication modes and are designed not to disturb other RF fields at the 
same frequency. 
2.5.5 Electronic Product Code (EPC): 
EPC was developed by the AutoID (Automatic identification) Center at MIT. The 
standardization is now within the responsibility of EPCglobal which is a joint venture 
between EAN International and the Uniform Code Council (UCC). The so-called EPC 
network is composed of five functional elements: 
• EPC: The Electronic Product Code is a 96 bit number identifying the EPC 
version number, domains, object classes and individual instances. 
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• RFID System: An identification system which consists of RFID tags and 
readers. Tags can be of six different kinds (Class 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) based on 
there functionality. 
• Savant: The savant middleware offers “Processing Modules or Services” to 
reduce load and network traffic within the back-end systems.  
• ONS: The Object Name Service is a networking service similar to the Domain 
Name Service (DNS). With ONS, the Electronic Product Code can be linked 
to detailed object information. The ONS servers return the IP address of the 
EPC information service which stores the associated information.  
• PML: The Physical Markup Language is XML-based and provides a 






3.1 Privacy Protection Approaches 
In this section we will discuss some of the approaches proposed by different 
scientist to protect the privacy of tag bearer.  
3.1.1 Kill Command: 
This solution was proposed by the Auto-ID center [18] and EPCglobal. In this 
scheme, each tag has a unique password, for example of 24 bits, which is programmed at 
the time of manufacture. Upon receiving the correct password, the tag will deactivate 
forever.  
3.1.2 Faraday Cage: 
Another way of protecting privacy of objects labeled with RFID tags is by 
isolating them from any kind of electromagnetic waves. This can be achieved by making 
what is known as a Faraday Cage (FC), a container made of metal mesh or foil that is 
impenetrable by radio signals (of certain frequencies). There are currently a number of 
companies that sell this type of solution [10]. 
3.1.3 Active Jamming: 
 24 
Another way of obtaining isolation from electromagnetic waves, and an 
alternative to the FC approach, is by disturbing the radio channel, a method which is 
commonly known as active jamming of RF signals. This disturbance can be achieved 
with a device that actively broadcasts radio signals, so as to completely disrupt the radio 
channel, thus preventing the normal operation of RFID readers.  
3.1.4 Blocker Tag: 
 If more than one tag answers a query sent by a reader, it detects a collision. The 
most, important singulation protocols are ALOHA (13.56 MHz) and the tree walking 
protocol (915 MHz). Juels [9] used this feature to propose a passive jamming approach 
based on the tree-walking singulation protocol, called blocker tag. A blocker tag 
simulates the full spectrum of possible serial numbers for tags. 
3.2 Bill of Rights 
In [16], Garfinkel proposed a so-called RFID bill of Rights, which adapts the 
principles of fair information practices to RFID systems deployment. This bill of rights 
consists of five guiding principles for RFID system creation and deployment. Users of 
RFID systems and purchasers of products containing RFID tags have: 
• The right to know if a product contains an RFID tag. 
• The right to have embedded RFID tags removed, deactivated, or destroyed when 
a product is purchased. 
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• The right to first-class RFID alternatives. Consumers should not lose other rights 
(such as the right to return a product or travel on a particular road) if they decide 
to opt-out of RFID or exercise an RFID tag’s kill feature. 
• The right to know what information is stored inside their RFID tags. If this 
information is incorrect, there must be means to correct or amend it. 
• The right to know when, where and why an RFID tag is being read.  
3.3 Security Protection Approaches 
 In this section we will discuss the approaches proposed to protect the security of 
the system.  
3.3.1 Non-Cryptographic Primitives: 
  There are some solutions which do not use true cryptographic operations. 
These are purely based on primitive operations.  
 3.3.1.1 Key Permutation: Vajda et al. [3] proposed several lightweight 
authentication protocols for authenticating RFID tags to readers.  
 It’s a challenge-response protocol (called Protocol 1), in which the tag and reader 
share a secret key, k (0).  The reader randomly selects a uniform bitstring x to construct a 
challenge. The reader transmits a (i) = x (i) ⊕  k (i) to the tag, where i is the ith transaction 
between the reader and tag. k (i) is calculated by a permutation of  k (0). Since the bitstring 
is selected randomly so the information passed, a (i), to the tag is random too. The tag 
uses its knowledge of k (i), to extract x (i) as follows: 
    a 
(i) ⊕  k (i) ⊕  k (0) = x (i) ⊕  k (i) ⊕  k (i) ⊕  k (0) 
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     = x (i) ⊕  k (0)                    
 The tag then responds to the reader with b (i) = x (i) ⊕  k (0). The reader verifies the 
correctness of the tag’s response since it knows x (i) and k (0).  
 The protocol is considered broken when an adversary can send a valid b (i) = x (i) 
⊕  k (0) or learn the value of k (0) as seen in figure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1: Steps 1 – 4 of VB Protocol 1 [13] 
3.3.2 Hash Functions Schemes: 
3.3.2.1 Hash-Lock Scheme: Weis et al. [2] proposed a simple hash-based protocol 
which enables to implement security at low cost. 
In hash-lock scheme, a back-end server stores both keys k and metaID’s as pairs 
in its database for all tags, where each tag has metaID = h(k) for its key. When a reader 
queries a tag, the tag transmits metaID to the reader as response. The reader sends 
metaID to the back-end server. Back-end server looks up the appropriate metaID and 
sends the corresponding key pair to the reader, which is transmitted to the tag. The tag 
hashes the key and compares it with the stored metaID. If those two values are matched, 
the tag sends its own ID to the reader. 
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This scheme requires implementing a hash function on the tag and managing keys 
on the back-end. Hash-lock scheme uses metaID as the unique ID of each tag for every 
read attempt. Thus, the data privacy of tag bearers is protected and the protocol can meet 
confidentiality. However, metaID is always constant so that attackers can eavesdrop it, 
identify each tag, and trace the tag. Therefore, location privacy of tag bearers is 
compromised.  
 
Figure 3.2: Hash-Locking: A reader unlocks a hash-locked tag [2]. 
Although this scheme is simple, it does not provide mutual authentication, suffers 
from the tracking problem, uses a hash function in the tag, the key is sent in plain text so 
forgery is possible, spoofing can be done, and is not forward secure [11]. 
3.3.2.2 Extended Hash-Lock Scheme: In extended hash-lock scheme [2], they 
proposed another method to overcome the tracing problem. 
This is an extension of the hash lock type scheme. It requires the tag to have a 
hash function and a pseudo-random generator. The tag picks random number R uniformly 
and calculates c = hash (IDk||R) as the tag’s unique identification for every session. The 
 28 
tag then sends c and R to the reader. The reader sends the data to the back-end database. 
The back-end server calculates the hash function for each ID stored in the database using 
the input as the received R and IDk of each tag. The back-end server then identifies the 
IDk that is related to the received c and sends the IDk to the reader.   
The tag output changes with each access, so this scheme deters tracking. This 
scheme is also strong for the replay attack. However, the tag can be traced if the tag’s ID 
is exposed. In addition, an adversary can query a tag to get a tag’s valid message pair (c, 
R). Later on, the attacker can impersonate that tag to legitimate reader. The response from 
the reader will identify the tag. Also, the implementation issue for the random number 
generator is still an issue. 
 
Figure 3.3: Randomized Hash-Locking: A reader unlocks a tag whose ID is k in the 
randomize hash-lock scheme [2]. 
 
Although this scheme deters tracking, it suffers from a high time complexity for 
tag identification. It also uses a hash function on the tag, the ID is sent in plain text so 
forgery is possible, does not provide mutual authentication and is not forward secure. 
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3.3.2.3 Hash-based Varying Identifier: This scheme was proposed by Henrici and 
Muller [12]. This scheme also adopts a hash function and a random number generator, 
but a pseudo random number is generated by a back-end server and transmitted to the tag 
for every interrogation to make the tag’s queried identifier random and preserve location 
privacy.  
In this protocol, RFID-tag needs to contain fields for the following entries: 
DB-ID ID TID LST 
 
The Back-End database needs to contain a table with the following entries for 
each record: 
HID 













(A ref  to Tag 
data) 
 
Step 1: Reader sends query to a tag. 
Step 2: Tag increases its transaction number (TID) by one and sends the h (ID), h 
(TID⊕ ID), and ∆TID = TID – LST back to the reader.  
Step 3: Reader sends this information back to the backend database indicated in DB-ID 
field. 
Step 4: In the backend database, record with HID = h (ID) is selected. Calculate TID* = 
LST + ∆TID. If h (TID*⊕ ID) matches h (TID⊕ ID) and TID* > TID, then the message 
is valid. A random number RND is generated. With this RND, a new ID is generated 
performing ID* = RND⊕ ID and HID = h (ID*) and is stored in the new record row. The 
AE-field is updated in both rows so that they can reference to each other. The TID* is 
stored in the TID field and in the LST field of the new row.  
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Step 5: Now a reply message containing RND and a hash h (RND⊕TID*⊕ ID) is created 
and send to the reader which forwards the message to the tag.  
Step 6: Tag verifies by calculating h (RND⊕TID⊕ ID) and if it’s same as sent by the 
database, then it updates its stored ID to the value RND⊕ ID and sets its LST to the TID 
value.  
 
Figure 3.4: Hash-based Enhancement Using Varying Identifiers [12]. 
This protocol can be compromised including an attack based on the non-
randomness of transmitted information, refreshment avoidance, and database 
desynchronization. It uses a hash function on the tag which increases the cost. This 
scheme does provide mutual authentication, but suffers from tracking and the 
desynchronization problem [11]. 
3.3.2.4 Hash Chain-based Scheme: Another authentication protocol was proposed 
by Okubo et al. [1] based on hash-chains, which renew the secret information contained 
in the tag, protects the user’s location privacy and anonymity. When a tag is requested by 
a reader, it sends a hash of its current identifier and then renews it using a second hash 
function. Initially tag has initial information s1. In the i-th transaction with the reader, the 
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RFID tag sends ai = G (si) to the reader and renews the secret si+1 = H (si) as determined 
from the previous secret si. Where H and G are hash functions. The reader sends ai to the 
back-end server. The back-end server database maintains a list of pairs (ID, s1), where s1 
is the initial secret information and is different for each tag. Then the back-end database 
calculates ai′ = G (H
i(s1)) for each s1 in the list, and checks if ai = ai′. If it finds, it returns 
the ID, which is a pair of ai′. 
 
Figure 3.5 Hash Chain Scheme [1]  
This protocol does not provide mutual authentication, uses two hash functions on 
the tag side and suffers from the scalability problem. 
3.3.2.5 Mutual Authentication Scheme based on Synchronized Secret: Lee et al. 
[21] proposed a mutual authentication scheme based on primitive operations and hash 
functions.  
The secret key (k) is shared between the tag and the back-end server. Database at 
back-end server has fields IDR, K, and Klast, which saves the ID, the current k, the 
preceding k (the previous secret information which is replaced by the current k), 
respectively. 
Step 1: Reader generates and saves a new pseudorandom number s and sends to it tag. 
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Step 2: Tag generates a new pseudorandom number r1 and sends to reader. Then it 
calculates r2= h (r1⊕ k⊕ s), and sends it to the reader. 
Step 3: Reader sends r1, r2 and s back to the back-end server. 
Step 4: Back-end server searches for k' from the fields K and Klast of the table, which 
satisfies the following equation: h (r1⊕  k' ⊕ s) ? r2. 
Step 5: If k' is found in the field K of record, then Klast= k' and K=h (k'). If k' is found in 
the field Klast of record, nothing is done. 
Step 6: Back-end server now calculates r3
’
 = h (r2⊕ k'⊕ s), and sends to the reader. 
Reader transfers r3
’ to the tag. 
Step 7: Tag test the following equation: r3
’ ?    r3. If it comes out true then k = h(k). 
 This protocol uses hash function and a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) 
on tag which greatly increases the price of tag. This protocol suffers from the scalability 
problem too. 
 From the above discussed protocols, we can see that all of them use either a 
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) or the hash function on the tag or they use 
both making the tag expensive. Hence, we need another approach to reduce the cost by 
making use of simple operations and less expensive alternatives so that this technology 






The reason that we cannot use well-known authentication protocols comes from 
the fact that such protocols do not preserve the privacy of the tag. In other words, the 
reader can check whether or not the identity claimed by the tag is true, but he cannot 
guess it himself: the tag must send his identity which in turn allows an adversary to track 
him.  
Asymmetric cryptography could easily solve this problem: the tag encrypts his 
identity with the public key of the reader. Thus, no eavesdropper is able to identify the 
tag.  Unfortunately, asymmetric cryptography is too heavy to be implemented within a 
tag.   
In symmetric cryptography, the problem remains that both tag and reader need to 
share a common secret-key instead of a public-key. In RFID systems, tags are not 
tamper-resistant. Therefore an attacker who tampers with a tag can track its past events, if 
the person had access to its previous interactions with the reader, e.g., from the readers’ 
log files. This is possible in those cases in which the tagged item was used for temporary 
purposes for sometime and then returned back. Using a common key for all the tags 
would be weak from a security standpoint: an attacker who 
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tampers with one tag, e.g., her own tag, would also be able to attack all the other tags in 
the system. Another approach consists of using a unique key for each tag, such that only 
the reader knows all these keys. However, this approach suffers from an expensive time 
complexity on the readers’ side. Indeed, because only symmetric cryptography functions 
can be used, the system needs to explore its entire database in order to retrieve the 
identity of the tag it queries. If n is the number of tags managed by the system, O (n) 
cryptographic operations are required in order to identify one tag. The advantage of the 
system over an attacker is that the system knows in which subset of identifiers it needs to 
search while the attacker has to explore the full range of identifiers. 
One of the major problems faced by current protocols today is the high cost of 
tags that makes them unusable for item level tagging. This is because using cryptographic 
operations on tags needs more computational power and memory. The goal of this thesis 
is to present a suite of ultra-light protocols that can be used for item level tagging. 
Security and performance analysis of the proposed protocol are done to see if it holds to 
the major privacy and security issues. Finally the proposed approach is applied to a 
supply chain system.   
Instead of using cryptographic operation like hash function or block ciphers on 
tags which require expensive tags, we will make use of basic bitwise operations, pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG) and pseudo-random function (PRF) to achieve the 
same level of privacy and security. Hence cheap tags can be used.  Table 3 shows the 




Table 3: Core Comparison [23, 24] 






20K – 23K Gates HASH 
Fast SHA-256 
Helion [23] 
23K – 26K Gates 
JetAES Tiny [24] 4370 Gates 
Feldhofer [25] 3595 Gates AES Unit 





PRF SSG [31] 1435 Gates 
 
The second problem is the high time complexity of tag identification which makes 
is unusable for high end systems and gives rise to the scalability problem. This problem 
can be solved by issuing each tag with a tag index number that is stored in the database as 
well. Instead of going through the entire database, each tag will be identified with its tag 
index number. However this tag index number will be updated on each successful mutual 
authentication which will make the tag untraceable.  
The third problem which is present in some protocols is the desynchronization of 
databases, which will lead to the problem of denial of service. The desynchronization 
problem happens when either the reader updates its values and the tag does not and vice 
versa. In case, if the tag updates its values, then that tag becomes non-functional. 
However if the reader updates its values and not the tag, this problem can be solved by 








 In this thesis, we propose five protocols. The first is an ultra-light 
mutual authentication protocol between RFID readers and tags based on PRN and 
primitive operations, the second and third protocols are variants of first one, the 
fourth is a light mutual authentication protocol based on PRF and master keys, the 
fifth is similar to fourth one with a difference of using only one master key for all 
the tags instead of using a master key for each tag. We propose multiple protocols 
as they provide different levels of security and costs for implementation, thus 
making it easier to choose the right protocol for the right environment. The 
motivation behind protocol 1 is to provide the cheapest solution without using a 
random number generator on the tag side. The motivation behind protocol 2 is to 
provide more security compared to the first one, but this comes with the cost of a 
using random number generator on the tag side. The motivation behind protocol 3 
is to achieve the same level of security as protocol 2 without the use of the 
random number generator on the tag side. The motivation for protocol 4 is to 
provide more security compared to the first, second and third protocols, but this 
comes with the cost of using PRF on both sides. The motivation for protocol 5 is 
to provide the same level of security as protocol 4 without the use of a master key 
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for each tag. In protocol 5, we make use of one master key for the whole system, 
instead of using a master key for each tag.  
5.1 Protocol 1 
5.1.1 Assumptions: 
In the first protocol, all the costly computing operations are done by the reader. 
We assume that readers are devices with enough computing power to generate random 
numbers and to perform any cryptographic operations. Communication must be initiated 
by readers due to the fact that low-cost tags are passive. We consider that the 
communication channel between the reader and the back-end database is secure. 
Therefore we consider both reader and back-end database as one entity. 
All tags are supplied with tag-index number (TIN) which is the index of the table 
(a row) where all the information about the tag is stored in the database. Each tag has an 
associated key which is divided in two parts (K = K1|| K2). Tag identification number 
(ID) which holds the information about the product to which it’s attached is also stored 
permanently in it. K1 and K2 values changes during authentication. 
the Tag stores the following data in it.  
TIN K1 K2 ID 
 
The Back-end database stores the  following data for each tag in the database.  




In this protocol the reader generates the random number by making use of PRNG. 
We describe the process of our authentication as follows:  
Step 1: Reader generates a random number n utilizing PRNG, and sends it to a tag. 
Step 2: Tag will create three messages A, B and C as follows and sends them back to 
reader: 
 A = K1 ⊕  n,  B = K2 ⊕  n,  C = TIN ⊕  n 
Step 3: Tag Identification: From message C, as reader already knows the random number 
n, reader will get the tag index number (TIN) for that particular tag as follow: 
   C ⊕  n ⇒TIN ⊕  n ⊕  n ⇒  TIN 
Step 4: Tag Authentication: Using this TIN, reader will look up in the database to find the 
record for that particular tag. Making use of values of K1, K2, K1last, K2last in the 
database for that particular tag we will authenticate the tag. We got two cases here for 
authentication: 
 Case 1: Both values stored in K1 and K2 can be used as follows: 
A ⊕  K1 ⇒K1⊕  n ⊕  K1 ⇒n,   B ⊕  K2 ⇒K2⊕  n ⊕  K2 ⇒n 
If the output from both messages A and B after XOR (⊕ ) with K1 and K2 
respectively yields n, which is known to the reader, it authenticates that the message 
came from a valid tag. This means that the tag exists in the database and it’s a new 
authentication process. 
Case 2: Or values stored in K1last and K2last can be used as follows: 
A ⊕  K1last ⇒K1⊕  n ⊕  K1last ⇒n 
B ⊕  K2last ⇒K2⊕  n ⊕  K2last ⇒n 
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If the output from both messages A and B after XOR (⊕ ) with K1last and K2last 
respectively yields n, this means that the tag exists in the database, however, back-end 
database already updated its K1 and K2 values at the previous authentication process but 
the tag didn’t.  
Step 5: Update Reader: Back-end database updates information of tag. 
 In case 1, where K1 and K2 values are used to authenticate the tag, values are 
updated as follows: 
   K1last = K1,   K2last = K2 
K1′ = K1⊕  n,  K2′ = K2 ⊕  n  
These values of K1′ and K2′ are stored in K1 and K2 respectively in the database.  
 In case 2, where K1last and K2last values are used, we do not update the values in 
the database. This means that the tag is trying to use the previous authentication values 
showing either tag didn’t update its values or some adversary is trying to hack the system. 
Step 6: Reader generates a new message D as follows and sends it to tag: 
D = TIN ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 
Step 7: Reader Authentication: As K1 and K2 are known to tag, it will use those values to 
get TIN from message D. If that TIN is same as TIN stored in tag, it validates that the 
message came from a legitimate reader thus giving us mutual authentication as follows: 
D ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⇒TIN ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⇒TIN 
Step 8: Update Tag: After mutual authentication, tag also updates its values of K1 and 
K2 as follows: 
K1′ = K1⊕  n,  K2′ = K2 ⊕  n 
These values of K1′ and K2′ are stored in K1 and K2 respectively in the tag. 
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Step 9: Tag will create a message E in which it will send its ID to the reader, releasing its 
information about the product as follows: 
E = TIN ⊕  ID⊕  n 
Modifications to the above described protocol can be achieved by making use of 
other primitive bitwise operations like AND (∧ ), and OR (∨ ) to make it more complex.  
 The process of authentication is shown in figure 5.1 on the next page.
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   READER 
(TIN, K1, K2, K1 last, K2 last, ID)  
TAG 
(TIN, K1, K2, ID) 




Create A=K1⊕ n , B=K2⊕ n, 
C=TIN⊕ n 
Tag Identification: 
From C; C⊕ n⇒TIN⊕ n⊕ n⇒TIN 
Find the record of TIN 
Tag Authentication: 
Case 1: A⊕K1⇒K1⊕ n⊕K1⇒n 
           B⊕K2⇒K2⊕ n⊕K2⇒n 
If Both outputs n, New authentication. 
Case2:A⊕K1last⇒K1⊕ n⊕K1last⇒n; 
B⊕K2 last ⇒K2⊕ n⊕K2 last ⇒n  




Case 1: Update the Values 
K1 last=K1; K2 last=K2;  
K1=K1⊕ n; K2=K2⊕ n 
Case 2: No Updates  
 




From D ; D⊕K1⊕K2 
⇒TIN⊕K1⊕K2⊕K1⊕K2 
⇒TIN 





K1=K1⊕ n; K2=K2⊕ n 
 ←E  Create E; E = TIN⊕ ID⊕ n 
 
Figure 5.1: Protocol 1 (PRNG on Reader Side) 
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5.2 Protocol 2 
5.2.1 Assumptions: 
This is a variant of the first protocol with a small difference. In this protocol, we 
make use of PRNG on both reader and tag side. All other assumptions made in protocol 1 
apply here also.  
5.2.2 Authentication: 
We describe the process of authentication as follows: 
Step 1: Reader generates a random number n1 utilizing PRNG, and sends it to a tag. 
Step 2: Tag generates a random number n2, creates three messages A, B and C; and then 
sends them back to reader as follows: 
A = K1 ⊕  n2,  B = K2 ⊕  n2,  C = TIN ⊕  n1 
Step 3: Tag Identification: From message C, as reader already knows the random number 
n1, reader will get the tag index number (TIN) for that particular tag as follows: 
   C ⊕  n1 ⇒TIN ⊕  n1 ⊕  n1 ⇒  TIN 
Step 4: Tag Authentication: Using this TIN, reader will look up in the database to find the 
record for that particular tag. Making use of values of K1, K2, K1last, K2last in the 
database for that particular tag we will authenticate the tag. We get two cases here for 
authentication: 
 Case 1: Both values stored in K1 and K2 of record can be used as follows: 
A ⊕  K1 ⇒K1⊕  n2 ⊕  K1 ⇒n2,   B ⊕  K2 ⇒K2⊕  n2 ⊕  K2 ⇒n2 
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If the output from both messages A and B after XOR (⊕ ) with K1 and K2 
respectively yields n2, it authenticates that the message came from a valid tag. This 
means that the tag exists in the database and it’s a new authentication process. 
Case 2: Or values stored in K1last and K2last of record can be used as follows: 
A ⊕  K1last ⇒K1⊕  n2 ⊕  K1last ⇒n2,  
B ⊕  K2last ⇒K2⊕  n2 ⊕  K2last ⇒n2 
If the output from both messages A and B after XOR (⊕ ) with K1last and K2last 
respectively yields n2, this means that the tag exists in the database, however, the back-
end database had already updated its K1 and K2 values at the previous authentication 
process but the tag didn’t.  
Step 5: Update Reader: Back-end database updates information about the tag as follows: 
 In case 1, where K1 and K2 values are used to authenticate the tag, values are 
updated as follows: 
K1last = K1,   K2last = K2 
K1′ = K1⊕  n2, K2′ = K2 ⊕  n2 
These values of K1′ and K2′ are stored in K1 and K2 respectively in the database.  
 In case 2, where K1last and K2last values are used, we do not update the values in 
the database. This means that the tag is trying to use the previous authentication values 
showing either tag didn’t update its values or some adversary is trying to hack the system. 
Step 6: Reader will create a new message D as follows and sends it to tag: 
D = TIN ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⊕  n2 
Step 7: Reader Authentication: As n2, K1 and K2 are known to tag, it will use those 
values to get TIN from message D. If this TIN is same as the one stored in tag, it will 
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validate that the message came from a legitimate reader thus giving us mutual 
authentication as follows: 
D ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⊕  n2 ⇒TIN ⊕K1⊕  K2⊕  n2 ⊕K1⊕  K2⊕  n2 ⇒TIN 
Step 8: Update Tag: After mutual authentication, the tag also updates its values of K1 
and K2 as follows: 
K1′ = K1⊕  n2, K2′ = K2 ⊕  n2 
These values of K1′ and K2′ are stored in K1 and K2 respectively in the tag. 
Step 9: Tag will create a message E in which it will send its ID to the reader, releasing its 
information about the product as follows: 
  E = TIN ⊕  ID⊕  n1⊕  n2 




(TIN, K1, K2, K1 last, K2 last, ID) 
 
TAG 
(TIN, K1, K2, ID) 





PRNG → n2 




C⊕ n1⇒TIN⊕ n1⊕ n1⇒TIN 
Find the record of TIN 
Tag Authentication: 
Case 1: Using K1 & K2 of record. 
A⊕K1⇒K1⊕ n2⊕K1⇒n2 
B⊕K2⇒K2⊕ n2⊕K2⇒n2 
If both outputs n2, Tag 
Authenticates. New 
Case 2: Using K1 last and K2 last. 
A⊕K1last⇒K1⊕ n2⊕K1last⇒n2 
B⊕K2 last⇒K2⊕ n2⊕K2 last⇒n2 













Case 1: Update for values. 
K1 last=K1; K2 last=K2;  
K1=K1⊕ n2; K2=K2⊕ n2 








Create D;   






From D;  
D⊕K1⊕K2⊕ n2⇒  
TIN⊕K1⊕K2⊕ n2⊕K1⊕K2⊕ n2 
⇒TIN 




K1=K1⊕ n2; K2=K2⊕ n2 
 ←E  Create E; E = TIN⊕ ID⊕ n1⊕ n2 
 
Figure 5.2: Protocol 2 (PRNG on Reader and Tag Side) 
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5.3 Protocol 3 
5.3.1 Assumptions: 
This protocol uses PRNG on the reader side and updating is done after mutual 
authentication. Only one previous key value is stored rather than two in this protocol. All 
other assumptions made in protocol 1 apply here.  
5.3.2 Authentication: 
We describe the process of authentication as follows: 
Step 1: Reader sends a message “hello” to the tag.  
Step 2: Tag sends back its tag index number (TIN) in response.  
Step 3: Tag Identification: Reader looks up the database and finds the record for that 
TIN. Then it creates a random number n from PRNG. It creates messages A, B and sends 
them to tag.   
A = K1 ⊕  n,  B = K2 ⊕  n 
Step 4: Reader Authentication: From messages A and B, tag will use the stored values of 
K1 and K2 to get the random number n as follows:  
A ⊕  K1 = K1 ⊕  n ⊕  K1 ⇒  n,  B ⊕  K2 = K2 ⊕  n ⊕  K2⇒  n 
 If both n are the same, then messages A and B came from an authentic reader.  
Step 5: Tag will create message C, D and send them to the reader as below: 
C = K1 ⊕  n,  D = ID ⊕  n 
Message D will contain the ID of the product to which that tag is attached, which can be 
retrieved by the reader easily.  
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Step 6: Tag Authentication: Making use of values of K1 and K1last in the database for that 
particular tag we will authenticate the tag. We can have two cases for tag authentication. 
 Case 1: Value stored in K1 of record is used to authenticate as below: 
C ⊕  K1 ⇒  K1 ⊕  n ⊕  K1 ⇒n  
 If n is the same as that generated by the tag, it authenticates that the message 
came from a valid tag. This means that the tag exists in the database and it’s a new 
authentication process.  
 Case 2: OR value stored in K1last of record is used to authenticate as below: 
C ⊕  K1last ⇒  K1 ⊕  n ⊕  K1last ⇒n  
If n is the same as that generated by the tag, this means that the tag exists in the 
database, however, the back-end database has already updated its K1 value at the 
previous authentication process but the tag did not.  
Step 7: Update Reader: The Back-end database will update information about the tag as 
follows: 
 In case 1, where K1 was used to authenticate the tag, values will be updated as 
follows: 
K1last = K1,   K1′ = K1⊕  n,  K2′ = K2 ⊕  n 
These values of K1′ and K2′ are stored in K1 and K2 respectively in the database.  
 In case 2, where the K1last value is used, we do not update the values in the 
database. This means a tag is trying to use the previous authentication values showing 
either the tag didn’t’ update or some adversary is trying to hack the system.      
Step 8: Reader will create message F as follows and sends it to tag: 
F = TIN ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⊕  n 
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Step 9: Reader Authentication: As K1 and K2 are known to the tag; it will use those 
values to get TIN from message F. If this TIN is the same as the one stored in the tag, it 
will validate that the message came from a legitimate reader. 
F ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⊕  n ⇒  TIN ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⊕  n ⊕  K1 ⊕  K2 ⊕  n ⇒TIN 
This protocol has an advantage in that it authenticates the reader twice.  
Step 10: Tag Update: and tag will update its values too as follows: 
K1′ = K1⊕  n,  K2′ = K2 ⊕  n 
These values of K1′ and K2′ are stored in K1 and K2 respectively in the tag. 
 The process of the authentication is shown in figure 5.3 on the next page. 
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READER 
(TIN, K1, K1 last ,K2, ID)  
TAG 
(TIN, K1, K2, ID) 





Find the record with TIN 
PRNG → n 









From A, A⊕K1=K1⊕ n⊕K1⇒n 
From B, B⊕K2=K2⊕ n⊕K2⇒n 
If ‘n’ are same, Reader is Authentic. 
Create C = K1⊕ n  and 
D = ID⊕ n  
Tag Authentication: 
Case 1: From C,  C⊕K1⇒  
K1⊕ n⊕K1⇒n  
If ‘n’ is same as generated, Tag 
is Authentic. New 
Case 2: From C , C⊕K1last ⇒  
K1⊕ n⊕  K1last⇒n 
If ‘n’ is same as generated, 
Previous Authentication  
 
Update Reader: 
Case 1: Update Values. 
K1 last=K1 
K1=K1⊕ n; K2=K2⊕ n; 
Case 2: No Updates.  
 




From F, F⊕K1⊕K2⊕ n⇒  
TIN⊕K1⊕K2⊕ n⊕K1⊕K2⊕ n 
⇒TIN 
If ‘TIN’ is same as stored in tag, 
Update the tag. 
K1=K1⊕ n; K2=K2⊕ n  
 
Figure 5.3: Protocol 3 (PRNG on Reader Side and Updating after Authentication) 
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5.4 Protocol 4 
5.4.1 Assumptions: 
All tags are supplied with a Master Key (K) and ID. The master Key (K) 
generates the seed (k) for all PRF as shown in the figure below. The PRF has two inputs, 
one is a secret seed (k) and other is a variable x. We can create different values from a 
PRF by chaining either k or x. When we use variable value as 1, we use it to update the 
master key. When we use variable values 2 and 3, we use it as pseudo-random numbers.  
 
Figure 5.4 Pseudo Random Seed production from Master Key 
The Tag stores the following data.  
K ID 
 
The Back-end database stores the following data for each tag in the database.  
K K last  ID 
5.4.2 Authentication: 
We describe the process of authentication as follows: 
Step 1: Reader sends a message “hello” to tag. 
K 
Kupdate = fK (1) 
Kprand = fK (2) 
 
Kmsg = fK (3) 
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Step 2: Tag generates pseudorandom numbers n1 and n2 using PRF with master Key as 
one of the inputs. Then it creates message α using PRF with n1 and n2 as input as shown 
in figure 5.5 and sends this message to reader as follows: 
n1 = fk (x)⇒  fk (3) = F (K, 3)  
 n2 = fk (x)⇒  fk (2) = F (K, 2)  
α = F (n1, n2)  
 
Figure 5.5: Creating Message α from PRF 
 Step 3: Tag Authentication: Reader will use the values of K and Klast in the database to 
carry out an exhaustive search to find that tag whose response is the same as the message 
received. We have two cases for tag authentication. 
 Case 1: K is used to authenticate the tag as below: 
F (fk (3), fk (2)) ?  α 
Reader will apply the PRF on the stored value of master key along with variables 
and compare it with the message received. If the PRF value comes out to be the same, 
that means that tag exits in the database and it’s a new authentication. 
F α X = 2 
K=K 
F 
F X = 3 
K=K 
X = n2 
K = n1 
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 Case 2: OR Klast is used to authenticate the tag as below: 
F (fklast (3), fklast (2)) ?  α 
This means that the back-end database already updated its K value at the previous 
authentication but the tag did not. This will catch the replay attack and will prevent the 
attacker from desynchronizing the database.  
Step 4: Update Reader: The Back-end database will update information about the tag as 
follows: 
 In case 1, where K was used to authenticate the tag, values will be updated as 
follows: 
Klast = K;  K = fk (x)⇒  fk (1) = F (K, 1) 
 In case 2, where Klast was used, we do not update the values in the database. This 
means a tag is trying to use the previous authentication value showing either the tag did 
not update last time or some adversary is trying to hack the system.  
Step 5: Reader generates pseudo-random numbers n3 and n4 using PRF and newly 
generated master key K as one of the inputs. Then it creates message β using PRF as 
shown in figure 5.6 with n3 and n4 as input and sends this message to the tag as follows: 
n3 = fk (x)⇒  fk (3) = F (K, 3)  
 n4 = fk (x)⇒  fk (2) = F (K, 2)  
β = F (n3, n4)  
Step 6: Reader Authentication: The Tag will compute the new value for the master key 
and will use this value to check if the message is the same as that sent by the reader as 
shown below: 
K' = fk (x)⇒  fk (1) = F (K, 1) 
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F (fk' (3), fk' (2)) ?  β  
If the value comes out the same as the message received, this means the reader is 
legitimate, thus giving mutual authentication. 
 
Figure 5.6: Creating Message β from PRF 
Step 7: Update Tag: Tag will update its values as below: 
K = fk (x)⇒  fk (1) = F (K, 1) 
Step 8: Tag will create message γ using the values of n1, n2 and ID as below: 
γ = ID⊕ n1⊕ n2 
The process of authentication is shown in figure 5.7 on the next page. 
F β X = 2 
K=K 
F 
F X = 3 
K=K 
X = n4 
K = n3 
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READER 
(K, K last , ID) 
 
TAG 









Generate n1, n2 using PRF. 
n1 = fk (x)⇒  fk (3) = F (K, 3)  
n2 = fk (x) ⇒ fk (2) = F (K, 2) 
Create α:  
Α = F (n1, n2)  
Tag Authentication: 
Find the tag ε D s.t. ∀ tags, 
We Check 
Case 1: F (fk (3), fk (2)) ?  α 
Case 2: F (fklast (3), fklast (2)) ?  α  
Update Reader:  
Case1: Klast = K; 
K = fk (x)⇒  fk (1) = F (K,1) 
Case 2: No update. 
  
Generate n3, n4 using PRF. 
n3 = fk (x) ⇒ fk (3) = F (K, 3) 
n4 = fk (x) ⇒ fk (2) = F (K, 2) 
Create β:  










K' = fk (x)⇒ fk (1) = F (K,1) 
and  Check 
 F (fk' (3), fk' (2)) ?  β  
Update Tag: 




Create γ : γ = ID⊕ n1⊕ n2 
 
Figure 5.7: Protocol 4 (Using Tag Master Key) 
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5.5 Protocol 5 
5.5.1 Assumptions: 
In this protocol, instead of using one master key for each tag, we use one master 
key for the whole system. This protocol is similar to the last one. Each tag is supplied 
with its tag number (TN), counter value (C), master key (K) and product ID.  
A Tag has to store the following data.  
K TN C ID 
 
The Back-end database has to store the following data for each tag in the database, where 
Clast is the value of C used last time.   
K TN  C Clast ID 
5.5.2 Authentication: 
We describe the process of authentication as follows: 
Step 1: Reader sends a message “hello” to tag. 
Step 2: Tag generates pseudorandom numbers n1 using PRF with tag number TN as X 
and master Key as K in the input. Then it creates a message α as shown in figure 5.8 
using PRF with n1, previously generated, and C as input and sends this message to the 
reader as follows: 
n1 = fk (x)⇒  fk (TN) = F (K, TN)  
 α = F (n1, C)  
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Figure 5.8: Creating Message α from PRF 
 Step 3: Tag Authentication: Reader will use the values of K, TN, C and Clast in the 
database to carry out an exhaustive search to find that tag whose response is the same as 
the message received. We have two cases for tag authentication. 
 Case 1: K, TN and C are used to authenticate the tag as below: 
F (fk (TN), C) ?  α 
This means that tag exits in the database and it’s a new authentication. 
 Case 2: OR K, TN and Clast are used to authenticate the tag as below: 
F (fklast (TN), Cklast )?  α 
This means that the back-end database already updated its C value at the previous 
authentication but the tag did not. This will catch the replay attack and will prevent the 
attacker from desynchronizing the database.  
Step 4: Update Reader: The Back-end database will update information about the tag as 
follows: 
α F 
F X = TN 
K=K 
X = C 
K = n1 
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 In case 1, where K, TN and C were used to authenticate the tag, values will be 
updated as follows: 
Clast = C;  C = C + 1 
 In case 2, where K, TN and Clast were used, we do not update the values in the 
database. This means a tag is trying to use the previous authentication values, showing 
either tag did not update last time or some adversary is trying to hack the system.  
Step 5: Reader generates pseudo-random numbers n2 using PRF with master key K and 
tag number TN. Then it creates message β as shown in figure 5.9 using PRF with n2 and 
C as input and sends this message to tag as follows: 
n2 = fk (x)⇒  fk (TN) = F (K, TN)  
β = F (n3, C)  
 
Figure 5.9: Creating Message β from PRF 
Step 6: Reader Authentication: Tag will compute the new value for counter and will use 
this value to check if the message is the same as sent by the reader as shown below: 
C' = C + 1 
β F 
F X = TN 
K=K 
X = C 
K = n2 
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F (fk (TN), C') ?  β 
If the value comes out the same as the message received, that means the reader is 
legitimate, thus giving mutual authentication.  
Step 7: Update Tag: Tag will update its values as below: 
C = C + 1 
Step 8: Tag will create the message γ using the values of n1, n2 and ID as below: 
γ = ID⊕ n1 
The process of authentication is shown in figure 5.10 on next page. 
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READER 
(K, TN, C, C last, ID) 
 
TAG 









Generate n1 using PRF. 
n1 = fk (x)⇒  fk (TN) = F (K, TN)  
Create α: 
Α = F (n1, C)  
Tag Authentication: 
Find the tag ε D s.t. ∀ tags, 
We Check 
Case 1: F(fk (TN), C) ?  α 
Case 2: F(fk (TN), Clast)?  α  
Update Reader:  
Case1: Clast = C; 
C = C+1; 
Case 2: No update. 
  
Generate n2 
n2 = fk (x) ⇒ fk (TN) = F (K, TN) 
Create β: 







Compute C': C' = C+1 
and  Check 
 F(fk (TN), C' ) ?  β  
Update Tag: 




Create γ : γ = ID⊕ n1 
 






6.1 Security Analysis of Protocol 1 
Data Integrity: A part of the tag memory is rewritable, modifications are possible. In this 
part of the memory, the tag stores the Tag-Index Number (TIN), and shared secret keys 
(K1 and K2) associated with itself. If an attacker does succeed in modifying this part of 
the memory, then the reader would not recognize the tag and would lead to database 
desynchronization problem.  
 An attacker can obtain the random nonce n created by legitimate reader. Then, he 
creates its own random nonce n' and sends it to the tag impersonating as a legitimate 
reader. The tag sends the messages A', B', and C' to the reader which is intercepted by the 
attacker. From this, the attacker retrieves TIN, K1 and K2. Then using the random nonce 
n created by the legitimate reader, it will create messages A, B, and C and send them to 
the reader. The reader authenticates the tag and creates a message D and sends it to the 
tag which is intercepted by the attacker. Instead of sending this message D created by the 
legitimate reader, the attacker instead sends D' to the tag which does not authenticates the 
reader. In this case only the tag is authenticated and Keys are updated at the reader side 
only and not on the tag side giving rise to database desynchronization problems.  
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 Another scenario is in which the attacker eavesdrops the messages and at the end 
can suppress the message D from being sent to the tag. In this case, values at the reader 
side will update and not on the tag side which can give rise to the database 
desynchronization problem.   
 Another scenario is in which the attacker instead of sending messages A, B, C to 
the reader, retrieves the values of K1, K2, TIN and n and use them to create message D. 
Then attacker sends this message to the tag, which authenticates it, updates the values on 
the tag side. In this case, tag side values are updated and not the reader side values, 
leading to the desynchronization problem. In this case, this tag will become useless. This 
case is however not possible due to the reason that the channel from tag to reader is much 
harder to eavesdrop than the channel from reader to tag.   
This shows that by manipulating message D, this protocol can give rise to a 
problem. However any change to messages A, B or C does not have any effect because if 
those messages are changed, it will not authenticate the tag. 
Mutual Authentication: This protocol is designed to provide both tag-to-reader 
authentication, which is achieved by message A, B, C and reader-to-tag authentication, 
obtained by message D. 
Forward Security: This protocol provides Forward Security. Its the property that security 
of message sent today will be valid tomorrow i.e. data transmitted today will still be 
secure even if the secret tag information is revealed by tampering in the future. A future 
security compromise on an RFID tag will not reveal data previously transmitted. If the 
attacker is able to get the data from the tag, he cannot trace the data back through past 
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events in which the tag was involved. The adversary, who only eavesdrops on the tag 
output, cannot associate the current output with past output. Forward security requires 
that old keys be unpredictable from new keys i.e. it’s unfeasible to compute previous 
keys and outputs from the current key.  
Since Key updating is done during the mutual authentication process using 
random numbers, it makes it impossible for the attacker to guess the values in future. 
Hence a future security compromise on an RFID tag will not reveal previous values of 
the shared secret key.   
Replay Attack: The key (K1 & K2) freshness for each successful read attempt prevents 
reply attacks.  
An eavesdropper could store the messages interchanged between the reader and 
the tag during different protocol runs. Then, he could try to impersonate as a tag, 
replaying the message A, B, C to the reader seen in any of the protocol runs. He could try 
to impersonate as a reader too, by replaying the message D to the tag. It seems that this 
could cause the loss of synchronization between the database and the tag, but this is not 
the case because after the successful read attempt in this mutual authentication protocol, 
the Key (K) is updated, which makes the previously used messages invalid.  
Replay attack is also prevented because the K1last and K2last store the previous last 
successful Keys. If the attacker tries to replay the messages A, B and C, using the Keys 
K1 and K2, it will be detected and no action will be taken by the reader. If the attacker 
tries to replay the message D to the tag, it will not authenticate the tag and no update will 
be done. 
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Man-in-the-middle Attack: A man-in-the-middle attack is possible. An attacker can 
impersonate as a legitimate reader and get the information from the tag, so he can 
impersonate as the legitimate tag responding to the reader. Thus, the attacker easily can 
be authenticated by the legitimate reader before the next session. As the attacker can 
easily make messages A, B and C; hence the man-in-the-middle attack is possible.   
However we assume a restriction on the ability of an attacker to perform man-in-
the-middle attack as the attacker would run the risk of being discovered since the attack 
would have to take place in a monitored environment.  
Data Confidentiality: All the information about the item to which the tag is attached is 
stored in TagID. This Tag ID is kept secure which guarantees user privacy. The tag ID is 
send to the reader in secure form. The tag sends it in the message E, where the ID is 
exclusive-ORed with the TIN, then the result is exclusive-ORed with the random number 
n, created by the reader. This ID can be retrieved by an eavesdropper from message E 
easily, therefore this protocol do not provide us with data confidentiality.  
Tag Anonymity: This protocol does not provide tag anonymity. As the TIN is sent back to 
the reader in message C, which will always be constant. If we modify TIN on each 
successful read attempt, then in case of man-in-the-middle attack, that tag cannot be 
identified.    
Indistinguishability: The values emitted by the tag should not be such that the attacker 
can easily identify the tag. The operations used in this protocol makes the data 
transmitted between tag and reader indistinguishable. All the messages passed to and fro 
between tag and reader looks identical to the eavesdropper.  
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Forgery Resistance: This protocol does not prevent forgery. If an attacker is able to 
retrieve the values of TIN, K1, K2 and ID from a legitimate tag, then he can simply copy 
the information to make a clone tag.  
However we assume a restriction on the ability of an attacker to record those 
values as he would run the risk of being discovered since the attack would have to take 
place in a controlled environment.   
Data Recovery: This protocol does not provide data recovery. In case where the messages 
A, B and C are blocked from the tag, that data cannot be retrieved. In such case, the 
reader will not update the values. In case the message D is blocked or modified, the 
reader would have updated the values and not the tag. When the reader queries the tag 
next time, it will send the same message D, which will update the values on the tag side 
too.  
6.2 Security Analysis of Protocol 2 
Data Integrity: In this protocol, the attacker has to send a random nonce n1 to the tag. 
The tag will generate a random nonce n2, then create messages A, B, C and send them to 
the attacker. This way attacker can retrieve the TIN from message C. Since messages A 
and B are using the values of K1, K2 and the random number generated by the tag, the 
attacker cannot retrieve the values of K1, K2 and n2 at this point. If the attacker 
intercepts the message D from the reader, he can obtain n2 by exclusive-ORing of 
message D with TIN, A and B.   
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If the message D is suppressed or altered, then the tag will not know or will not 
authenticate the reader respectively. Since message D is created after the reader updates 
its values, the values on the tag side will be different causing data integrity compromise.  
If messages A and B from the tag are suppressed or altered by the attacker, then 
the reader will not authenticate the tag and it will not generate message D from which the 
attacker retrieves n2. This means that the attacker has no control over updating the values 
on the reader side.    
The effect of changing the values at the reader side, do nothing as this protocol 
catches such ambiguity thus providing us data integrity.  
Mutual Authentication: Mutual authentication is achieved by messages A, B, C, and D. 
Tag-to-reader authentication is achieved from messages A, B, and C. whereas reader-to-
tag authentication is achieved from message D.  
Forward Security: This protocol provides forward security i.e. data transmitted today will 
still be secure even if secret tag information is revealed by tampering in the future. 
Forward security requires that old keys be unpredictable from new keys. As Key updating 
is done during mutual authentication using the random number generated by the tag, it is 
impossible for an attacker to guess the values or to make an association between the 
current and past outputs. Thus the contents of memory in the tag do not give any hint to 
detecting past outputs.  
Replay Attack: The key (K1 & K2) freshness for each successful read attempt prevents 
reply attacks. Replaying messages A, B, C to the reader will cause no harm as these 
messages will be unable to authenticate the attacker as a legitimate tag because once the 
messages were used, the values of K1, K2 are updated at the reader end making these 
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messages invalid. Replaying message D to the tag will have no effect either as the 
message will be unable to authenticate the attacker as a legitimate reader.  
Man-in-the-middle Attack: A man-in-the-middle attack is possible. If the attacker is able 
to create messages A, B and C, then he can impersonate as a legitimate tag and make the 
legitimate reader to authenticate it. An attacker can retrieve random nonce n2, from 
message D and then use it to make those messages.  
However we assume a restriction on the ability of an attacker to perform a man-
in-the-middle attack as the attacker would run the risk of being discovered since the 
attack would have to take place in a monitored environment.  
Data Confidentiality: This protocol does not provide user data confidentiality. Tag sends 
its ID in the message E, where the ID is exclusive-ORed with the TIN, and then the result 
is exclusive-ORed with the random number n1 and n2. This hides the tag ID from a 
nearby eavesdropper equipped with an RFID reader who listens to the message E. An 
attacker who already knows the values of TIN, n1 and n2, will get the ID from the 
message E.   
Tag Anonymity: This protocol does not provide Tag anonymity. The TIN is sent back to 
the reader in message C, which will always be constant. If we modify the TIN on each 
successful read attempt, then in case of man-in-the-middle, that tag cannot be identified.    
Indistinguishability: The operations used in this protocol makes the data transmitted 
between tag and reader indistinguishable. All the messages passed to and fro between tag 
and reader looks identical to the eavesdropper.  
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Forgery Resistance: This protocol does not prevent forgery. If an attacker is able to 
retrieve the values of TIN, K1, K2 and ID from a legitimate tag, then he can simply copy 
the information to make a clone tag.  
We also assume a restriction on the ability of an attacker to record those values as 
he would run the risk of being discovered since the attack would have to take place in a 
monitored environment.  
Data Recovery: This protocol provides data recovery. If the attacker blocks the messages 
A, B, and C from the tag, he cannot create message D. The message D can only be 
created using random nonce n2, which can be retrieved only from message D from the 
reader. Thus changing the values on the tag side only is not possible. In case the message 
D is blocked or modified, the reader would have updated the values and not the tag. 
When the reader queries the tag next time, it will send the same message D, which will 
update the values on the tag side too.  
6.3 Security Analysis of Protocol 3 
Data Integrity: This protocol provides data integrity (information related to tag) i.e. TIN, 
K1 and K2.  
Modifying the values only at the reader end is possible. After mutual 
authentication, the reader updates its values first. Hence, if the message F from reader is 
blocked or modified, then the tag will not know or will not validate the message 
respectively causing data integrity compromise which can lead to database 
desynchronization. However this ambiguity will be caught by this protocol in the next run 
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as it will fall under case 2, which will not update the values on the reader side and just 
replay the previous message F.  
Modifying the values on the tag side only is not possible. If the attacker blocks or 
modifies the message C to the reader, then the reader will not know or validate the tag 
respectively. An attacker cannot create message F on its own, as it needs a random 
number n generated by a legitimate reader, which he can not retrieve.   
Mutual Authentication: This protocol provides mutual authentication in which messages 
A and B provides reader-to-tag authentication, and message C provides tag-to-reader 
authentication. 
Forward Security: This protocol provides forward security i.e. data transmitted today will 
still be secure even if the secret tag information is revealed by tampering in the future. 
Since forward security requires that old keys be unpredictable from new keys i.e. it is 
unfeasible to compute previous keys and outputs from the current key. As Key updating 
is done using the random number generated by the reader, after mutual authentication it’s 
impossible for an attacker to guess the values or to make an association between the 
current and past outputs. Thus contents of memory in the tag do not provide any hint on 
detecting past outputs. 
Replay Attack: This protocol prevents replay attacks because key (K1 & K2) refreshing 
takes place after mutual authentication.   
An attacker could store the messages interchanged between the reader and the tag 
(different protocol runs). Then he could try to impersonate a reader, by replaying the 
messages A, B and F to the tag. It may appear that the tag will authenticate the attacker as 
a legitimate reader, however, this is not possible as the values of K1, K2 would have to 
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be updated in the last mutual authentication run, which makes the previously used 
messages invalid.   
An attacker could try to impersonate as a tag too, replaying the message C to the 
reader seen in any of the protocol runs.  This attack is prevented because the K1last stores 
the previous last successful value of K1. If the attacker tries to replay the messages C, it 
will be detected and no action will be taken by the reader.  
Man-in-the-middle Attack: A man-in-the-middle attack is possible. An attacker can 
impersonate as a legitimate reader and get the information from the tag, so that he can 
impersonate as the legitimate tag responding to the reader. Thus, the attacker can easily 
be authenticated by the legitimate reader before the next session. The attacker can 
retrieve random nonce n, from message F and then he can make a message C. Thus, the 
man-in-the-middle attack is possible.   
 We assume a restriction on the ability of an attacker to perform MITM attack by 
blocking the messages, as the attacker would run the risk of being discovered since the 
attack would have to take place in a monitored environment.  
Data Confidentiality: This protocol does not provide user data confidentiality. The tag 
sends its ID in the message D, where the ID is exclusive-ORed with the random number 
n generated by a legitimate reader. This hides the tag ID from a nearby eavesdropper 
equipped with an RFID reader who listens to the message D. An attacker, who wants to 
retrieve the ID from message D will have to wait till message F is created so that he can 
get n.    
Tag Anonymity: This protocol does not provide Tag anonymity. As the TIN is sent back 
to the reader in response to a reader’s message ‘hello’, which will always be constant. If 
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we modify TIN on each successful read attempt, then in case of MIMA, that tag cannot 
be identified.    
Indistinguishability: The operations used in this protocol makes the data transmitted 
between tag and reader indistinguishable. All the messages passed to and fro between tag 
and reader looks identical to the eavesdropper.  
Forgery Resistance: This protocol does not prevent forgery. If an attacker is able to 
retrieve the values of TIN, K1, K2 and ID from a legitimate tag, then he can simply copy 
the information to make a clone tag.  
We also assume a restriction on the ability of an attacker to record those values as 
he would run the risk of being discovered since the attack would have to take place in a 
monitored environment.  
Data Recovery: This protocol provides data recovery. In case the message F is blocked or 
modified, the reader would have updated the values and not the tag. When the reader 
queries tag next time, it will send the same message F, which will update the values on 
the tag side too. Changing the values on the tag side alone is not possible as message C 
cannot be created without knowing the random nonce n.  
6.4 Security Analysis of Protocol 4 
Data Integrity: This protocol provides data integrity for both the tag as well as the item to 
which that tag is attached. In this protocol an attacker is unable to modify any values 
either on the tag or the reader side making the tag data secure.  
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If the attacker blocks message α, then he cannot create β on its own. The attacker 
may intercept the message α from the tag, modify it and send α' to the reader. This will 
have no effect because this message will not authenticate the tag to the reader.    
If the attacker blocks the message β from going to the tag, then the reader would 
have updated and not the tag. On the next authentication step, the reader would recognize 
this because it has stored the last value of K. 
If the attacker intercepts the message β from the reader, modifies it, and sends β' 
to the tag, it will not authenticate the reader to the tag as the values have to be the same. 
In this case, the tag will not update the values and will not send the message γ to the 
attacker. On the next authentication step, this tag will update its values.  
If the attacker intercepts the message γ, then the attacker has to guess random 
numbers n1 and n2 created by the tag. Since n1and n2 are created from PRF using master 
key K, those values have changed during the last run since it was updated and so the 
value is of no use to the attacker.     
If the attacker sends the message ‘hello’ to the tag, it will generate its random 
number n1 and n2 from the PRF making use of master key as the secret hidden seed. The 
tag will then create a message α, which is sent back to the attacker. From this message, 
the attacker cannot retrieve anything. At this point the attacker has to guess three things, 
first he has to guess the master key K, second, the PRF used by the tag to generate n1 and 
n2, and thirdly, guess the PRF used to generate the message α. 
Similarly, the message β generated by the reader makes no sense to the attacker. 
To retrieve anything from this message, the attacker has to guess the new master key K, 
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guess the PRF used to generate n3, n4 and then guess the PRF used to generate the 
message β.  
If the attacker is able to guess those PRFs, then he has to guess the master key K 
at a certain point in time too because they are updated at each successful authentication. 
Mutual Authentication: This protocol is designed to provide both tag-to-reader 
authentication, which is achieved by message α and reader-to-tag authentication, obtained 
by message β. 
Forward Security: This protocol is forward secure. Since the tags do not store any 
historic data, even if the attacker succeeds in guessing the PRF, he will not be able to 
retrieve any past information about the tag because the master key K value is updated on 
each authentication. It will be unfeasible to compute previous keys and outputs from the 
current key.  
Replay Attack: The master key K freshness for each successful authentication prevents 
from reply attacks.  
An eavesdropper could store the messages α and β between the reader and the tag 
during different protocol runs. Then he could try to impersonate a tag, replaying the 
message α to the reader. He could try to impersonate a reader too, by replaying the 
message β to the tag. It may appear that this could cause the loss of synchronization 
between the database and the tag, but this is not possible because the master key K value 
is updated after each successful authentication making the previously used messages 
invalid. 
Man-in-the-middle Attack: A man-in-the-middle attack is not possible. An attacker can 
impersonate as a legitimate reader and get the information from the tag, so he can 
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impersonate as the legitimate tag responding to the reader. Thus, the attacker can easily 
be authenticated by the legitimate reader before the next session. As the attacker cannot 
create message α, the man-in-the-middle attack is not possible.   
Data Confidentiality: All the information about the item to which the tag is attached is 
stored in the ID. This ID is kept secure which guarantees user privacy. This ID is sent to 
the reader in secure form. The tag sends it in the message γ in which the ID is exclusive-
ORed with n1, then the result exclusive-ORed with n2 making the data more secure and 
meaningless to the attacker. 
Tag Anonymity: During each successful mutual authentication, the master key is updated. 
This makes the tag partially anonymous.  
If the attacker sends the message ‘hello’ at time t1 to get the message α, and then 
tries again at time t2 to get the same message α, this way the attacker can track the tag. 
However if the legitimate reader reads between time t1 and t2, then the attacker cannot 
track the tag because the master key value would have changed by that time.   
Indistinguishability: The operations used in this protocol makes the data transmitted 
between the tag and the reader indistinguishable. All the messages passed to and fro 
between the tag and the reader looks identical to the eavesdropper.  
Forgery Resistance: If an attacker is able to retrieve the value of K from a legitimate tag, 
then he can simply copy the information to make a clone tag. For an attacker to retrieve 
ID from message γ, he has to retrieve random number n1 and n2 created by the tag using 
PRF making use of master key K. He cannot retrieve those numbers from message α. 
Thus the real value of tag i.e. the ID can not be retrieved by the attacker; this makes 
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copying the values to the clone tag useless. This protocol provides protection against 
forgery. 
Data Recovery: This protocol provides data recovery. In case the message β is blocked or 
modified, the reader would have updated the values and not the tag. When the reader 
queries tag next time, it will send the same message β, which will update the values on 
the tag side too.  
6.5 Security Analysis of Protocol 5 
Data Integrity: This protocol provides data integrity for both tag as well as the item to 
which that tag is attached. In this protocol the attacker is unable to modify any values 
either on the tag or the reader side making the tag data secure. Data integrity of the item 
to which the tag is attached is not compromised either, because the information about the 
item is stored in the ID, which is sent in the secure form. 
If the attacker blocks the message α, then he cannot create β on its own. If the 
attacker intercepts the message α from the tag, modifies it and sends α' to the reader, then 
this message will not authenticate the tag to the reader.   
If the attacker blocks the message β from reaching the tag, then only in this case 
the reader side will have updated the values for that particular tag, but not the tag side 
giving rise to desynchronization of the database. However, this is not the case as the last 
value of C is stored in the database and for the next authentication; it can recognize that 
tag easily making use of case 2.   
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If the attacker intercepts message β from the reader, modifies it, and sends β' to 
the tag, it will not authenticate the reader to the tag. In this case, the tag will not update 
the values and will not send the message γ to the attacker.  
If the attacker sends the message ‘hello’ to the tag, it will generate its random 
number n from the PRF making use of the master key as the secret hidden seed. The tag 
will then create a message α, which is sent back to the attacker. From this message, the 
attacker cannot retrieve anything. At this point attacker has to guess four things, first he 
has to guess the master key K, second, the TN of the tag, third, the  PRF used by the tag 
to generate n1, and fourth, the value of counter C to get anything out of message α.  
Similarly, the message β generated by the reader, makes no sense to the attacker. 
To retrieve anything from this message, the attacker has to guess the master key K, guess 
the PRF used to generate n2 and guess the counter C used to create message β. 
If the attacker intercepts the message γ, then the attacker has to guess the random 
number n1 created by the tag. Since n1 is generated using the PRF with master key K, n1 
cannot be retrieved.     
Mutual Authentication: This protocol is designed to provide both tag-to-reader 
authentication, which is achieved by message α and reader-to-tag authentication, obtained 
by message β. 
Forward Security: Since the tags do not store any historic data, even if the attacker 
succeeds in guessing the PRF, he will not be able to retrieve any past information about 
the tag because the counter C value is updated on each mutual authentication. An attacker 
cannot guess the previous outputs from the tag as the counter values C changes on each 
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mutual authentication. Thus it is hard for an attacker to guess what the output was back in 
time. 
Replay Attack: The counter value C freshness for each successful authentication prevents 
from reply attacks. An eavesdropper could store the messages α and β between the reader 
and the tag during different protocol runs. Then, he could try to impersonate a tag, 
replaying the message α to the reader. If that happens it will fall under case 2 of reader 
authentication in which no update will be done and the reader will create the same 
message β again.  
An eavesdropper could try to impersonate a reader too, by replaying the message 
β to the tag. If that happens, the tag is not going to authenticate that response as the value 
of the counter was changed on the last authentication making this message invalid.  
Man-in-the-middle Attack: A man-in-the-middle attack is not possible. An attacker can 
impersonate as a legitimate reader and get the information from tag, so he can 
impersonate as the legitimate tag responding to the reader. Thus, the attacker easily can 
be authenticated by the legitimate reader before the next session. As the attacker can not 
create message α, so man-in-the-middle attack is not possible.   
Data Confidentiality: All the information about the item to which the tag is attached is 
stored in the ID. This ID is kept secure which guarantees user privacy. This ID is sent to 
the reader in secure form. The tag sends it in the message γ in which the ID is exclusive-
ORed with n1 making the data more secure and meaningless to the attacker. 
Tag Anonymity: During each successful mutual authentication, counter value C is 
updated which makes the tag partially anonymous.  
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If the attacker sends the message ‘hello’ at time t1 to get the message α, and then 
tries again at time t2 to get the same message α in this manner the attacker can track the 
tag. However if the legitimate reader reads between times t1 and t2, then the attacker 
cannot track the tag because the counter value would have changed by that time.   
Indistinguishability: The operations used in this protocol makes the data transmitted 
between tag and reader indistinguishable. All the messages passed to and fro between the 
tag and the reader looks identical to the eavesdropper.  
Forgery Resistance: If an attacker is able to retrieve the value of K, TN and C from a 
legitimate tag, then he can simply copy the information to make a clone tag. For an 
attacker to retrieve the ID from message γ, he has to retrieve random number n1 
generated by the tag using PRF making use of master key K. He cannot retrieve that 
number from message α. Thus the real value of the tag i.e. the ID can not be retrieved by 
the attacker. This makes copying the values to the clone tag useless. This protocol 
provides protection against forgery. 
Data Recovery: This protocol provides data recovery. In case the message β is blocked or 
modified, the reader would have updated the values and not the tag. When the reader 
queries the tag next time, it will send the same message β, which will update the values 
on the tag side too.  
 All the proposed protocols in this thesis are compared with each other in table 4 
for security analysis. 
Table 4: Comparison of Security Requirements between Proposed Protocols 
Protocol P 1  P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 
User Data confidentiality Χ Χ Χ Ο Ο 
Tag Anonymity Χ  Χ  Χ ∆ ∆ 
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Data Integrity Χ  Ο    Ο  Ο Ο 
Mutual Authentication Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Forward Security Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Man-in-the-middle Attack Χ Χ   Χ   Ο  Ο 
Replay Attack Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Forgery Resistance Χ  Χ Χ Ο Ο 
Indistinguishability Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Data Recovery Χ   Ο  Ο  Ο   Ο  
†† Notation: Ο   Satisfied  ∆   Partially Satisfied  Χ   Not Satisfied 
 All the proposed protocols in this thesis are compared with other protocols in 
table 5.  
Table 5: Comparison of Security Requirements with Other Protocols 
Protocol HLS  EHLS HBIV MAP P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 
User Data 
confidentiality 
Χ ∆ ∆ Ο Χ  Χ Χ Ο Ο 
Tag Anonymity Χ ∆ ∆ Ο Χ Χ Χ  ∆ ∆ 
Data Integrity ∆ ∆ Ο Ο Χ  Ο   Ο   Ο   Ο 
Mutual 
Authentication 
∆ ∆ ∆ Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Forward Security ∆ ∆ Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Man-in-the-middle 
Attack 
∆ ∆ Χ Ο Χ Χ   Χ   Ο  Ο 
Replay Attack ∆ ∆ Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Forgery Resistance Χ Χ Χ Ο Χ  Χ Χ Ο Ο 
Indistinguishability Χ Χ Χ Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Data Recovery Χ Χ Ο Ο Χ Ο  Ο  Ο  Ο  
†† Notation: Ο   Satisfied  ∆   Partially Satisfied  Χ   Not Satisfied 
 From the table 5, we can see that the Mutual authentication protocol proposed by 
Yang [26] satisfies all the security requirements. However, that protocol uses a hash 
function on the tag which makes them much more expensive as compared to our 
proposed protocols. We have tried to come up with the same level of security without 







 It is important to carefully analyze the performance of the proposed scheme, to 
show that it can be safely implemented even in low-cost tags. It is assumed that the 
connection between the reader and the database is secure. Moreover, the readers and 
databases are devices with non-limited computing and storing capabilities. Due to these 
reasons we can collapse the notion of the reader and the back-end database into single 
entity (R+B). Therefore, in the performance analysis of our protocol, we consider the 
reader and database form a single entity.  
7.1 Performance Analysis of Protocol 1 
Computation Overhead: In this protocol, the tag only needs XOR operation whereas the 
reader needs XOR operation and PRNG. This protocol provides the minimal computation 
load on both the tag and reader side. Low-cost RFID tags are very limited devices, with 
only a small amounts of memory, and very constrained computationally (only between 
200 and 2000 logic gates can be devoted to security-based tasks). Additionally, one of the 
main drawbacks that hash-based solutions have is that the load on the server-side (R+B) 
is proportional to the number of tags. Our proposal have completely solved this problem 
by using Tag-Index Number (TIN) that allows a tag to be univocally identified.  
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Storage Overhead: We assume that the sizes of all components are L bits. Our protocol is 
based on pseudonyms, concretely on an L-bit TIN, so each tag has to store it. For the 
implementation of our protocol, each tag should have an associated key of length 2L, 
which is used for mutual authentication. Moreover, the tag has to store a unique 
identification number (ID) of length L. Thus the tag needs a memory size of 4L bits. 
However the reader needs memory size of 6L due to additional storage cost of K1last and 
K2 last. 
Communication Overhead: The proposed protocol accomplishes mutual authentication 
between tag (T) and reader (R+B), requiring only three rounds. Taking into account that 
low cost tags are passive, and that the communication can only be initiated by a reader, 
three rounds may be considered as a reasonable number for mutual authentication in 
RFID environments. Therefore the proposed protocol is feasible and practical for a low-
cost RFID environment. 
7.2 Performance analysis for Protocol 2 
Computation Overhead: In this protocol, the tag needs a PRNG and XOR operation 
whereas the reader needs XOR operation and PRNG. This protocol has an extra overhead 
of generating PRNG on the tag side. However the tag is identified easily making use of 
TIN in the database.    
Storage Overhead: We assume that the sizes of all components are L bits. This protocol 
needs L-bit TIN, each tag should have an associated key of length 2L and it has to store a 
unique identification number (ID) of length L. Thus the tag needs the memory size of 4L 
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bits. However the reader needs memory size of 6L bits due to additional storage cost of 
K1last and K2 last.  
 Communication Overhead: The proposed protocol accomplishes mutual authentication 
between tag (T) and reader (R), requiring only three rounds. Therefore the proposed 
protocol is feasible and practical for low-cost RFID environment.  
7.3 Performance analysis for Protocol 3 
Computation Overhead: In this protocol tag only needs XOR operation whereas the 
reader needs XOR operation and a PRNG. Since the tag is identified in the database using 
TIN, we don’t have to go through the whole database to find the tag and compute its 
identity as done in other protocols.  
Storage Overhead: We assume that the sizes of all components are L bits. This protocol 
needs L-bit TIN, each tag should have an associated key of length 2L and it has to store a 
unique identification number (ID) of length L. Thus the tag needs a memory size of 4L 
bits. However the reader needs memory size of 5L bits due to additional storage cost of 
K1last.  
Communication Overhead: The proposed protocol accomplishes mutual authentication 
between tag (T) and reader (R), requiring only four rounds. Therefore the proposed 
protocol is feasible and practical for low-cost RFID environment.  
7.4 Performance analysis for Protocol 4 
Computation Overhead: In this protocol, tag needs PRF operation whereas the reader 
needs PRF operation too.  
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 When a reader sends a message ‘hello’ to the tag, it will generate two random 
numbers n1 and n2 from the PRF making use of the master Key and will respond with 
message α to the reader. Then the system has to carry out an exhaustive search to find 
that tag whose response is same as the message received. Therefore the system’s 
workload is linear to the number of tags. If such a tag is found, then updating the reader 
side values takes place. The Reader will generate new random number n3 and n4 from 
the PRF, which it uses to make message β. The tag will then authenticate the reader.   
Storage Overhead: We assume that the sizes of all components are L bits. For each tag, 
this protocol needs master key of length L and it has to store a unique identification 
number (ID) of length L. Thus the tag needs a memory size of 2L bits. Reader needs a 
memory size of 3L bits because of added K last.  
Communication Overhead: The proposed protocol accomplishes mutual authentication 
between tag (T) and reader (R), requiring only three rounds making it feasible and 
practical for low-cost RFID environment. 
7.5 Performance analysis for Protocol 5 
Computation Overhead: In this protocol, tag and reader both needs PRF operations.  
 When a reader sends a message ‘hello’ to the tag, it will generate a random 
numbers n1 from the PRF making use of the master Key and the tag number TN, and will 
respond with message α to the reader. Then the system has to carry out an exhaustive 
search to find that tag whose response is the same as the message received. Therefore the 
system’s workload is linear to the number of tags. If such tag is found, then updating the 
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reader side values takes place. The Reader will generate a new random number n2 from 
the PRF, create message β and send it to the tag. The tag will then authenticate the reader.   
Storage Overhead: We assume that the sizes of all components are L bits. For each tag, 
this protocol needs master key of length L, tag number TN, counter value C, and it has to 
store a unique identification number (ID) of length L. Thus the tag needs a memory size 
of 4L bits. The Reader needs the memory size of 5L bits because of added C last.  
Communication Overhead: The proposed protocol accomplishes mutual authentication 
between tag (T) and reader (R), requiring only three rounds making it feasible and 
practical for low-cost RFID environment. 
 All the proposed protocols in this thesis are compared with each other for their 
computational loads and memory requirements in table 6 as shown below.  
Table 6: Computational Loads and Memory Requirement for Proposed Protocols 
Protocol Entity P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 
T ¬ 1 ¬ ¬ ¬ 
PRNG Operation 
R 1 1 1 ¬ ¬ 
T ¬ ¬ ¬ 6 2 
PRF Operation 
R ¬ ¬ ¬ 2 n + 4 2 n + 1 
T 11 13 9 2 3 
Exclusive-OR Operations 
R 8 12 9 ¬ 2 n + 1 
Authentication Steps 3 3 4 3 3 
T 4L 4L 4L 2L 4L 
Required Memory 
R 6L 6L 5L 3L 5L 
Identification 
Computation 
R O(1) O(1) O(1) O(n) O(n) 
†† Notation: ¬   Not Required n   Number of Tags  L   Size of Memory  
 
Table 7 shows a comparison made by Yang [26] of the security requirements of 
different proposals. Our protocols are added to that table.   
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Table 7: Comparison of Computational Load and Memory Requirement with Other 
Protocols 
Protocols Entity HLS EHLS HBVI MAP P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 
T 1 2 3 2 ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ Hash 
Operations B ¬ N 3 2n ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ 
R ¬ ¬ ¬ 1 ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ Keyed Hash 
Operation B ¬ ¬ ¬ 1 ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ 
T ¬ 1 ¬ ¬ ¬ 1 ¬ ¬ ¬ 
R ¬ ¬ ¬ 1 1 1 1 ¬ ¬ 
PRNG 
Operation 
B ¬ ¬ 1 ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ 
T ¬ ¬ ¬ 4 11 13 9 2 3 
Basic 
Operations R+B ¬ ¬ ¬ 
2(n 
+1) 





B ¬ ¬ ¬ 1 ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ 
Number of 
Decryption 
R ¬ ¬ ¬ 1 ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ 




1  1L 3L L
2
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1  9L L
2
1
9  6L 6L 5L 3L 5L  
Identification 
Computation 
R O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(n) O(n) 






APPLICATION OF PROPOSOD SECURO RFID PROTOCOLS 
 To reduce the cost of RFID tags, bulky data about products is stored in backend 
databases and accessible through the internet. Only a minimum amount of information 
such as product IDs and light-weight security primitives are stored in the RFID tags. 
These tags are attached to containers, pallets, and/or items. A networked RFID system 
proposed by EPCGlobal including Tag, Reader, Savant, Electronic Product Code 
Information System (EPCIS) and Object Name Service (ONS) is shown in the figure 8.1.  
 
TAG 












Fig 8.1 Networked RFID 
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8.1 Supply Chain Application 
In supply chain systems, a supply chain partner uses RFID readers to collect 
product information from RFID tags. The collected information is then sent to savant 
system for further interpretation and process. Meanwhile, a supply chain information 
flow can take place between supply chain partners through internet connections as shown 
in the figure 8.2. 
 


















8.1.1 System Model:  
Yingjiu [29] proposed a protocol that is applied on a supply chain system. In that 
protocol they used a hash function on the tag. They have shown how to implement their 
protocol when a number of partners are engaged for a particular batch of tags. We have 
used the same strategy and have applied our protocol to that situation. We have also 
proved that the security requirements as proposed by them for supply chain are satisfied 
by our protocol. In our model, instead of using hash functions on tags, we have used PRF, 
which makes the tags much cheaper. We have proposed that the tag information should 
be transmitted to the next partner instead of the previous partner as proposed in their 
protocol.  
We consider a supply chain consisting of N partners denoted by P1, P2 … PN.  
Material flow of items between the partners is equipped with RFID tags. It originates 
from P1 and is shipped along the supply chain in the sequence of P1, P2…Pi, Pi+1 … PN.  
When the flow arrives at P1, it has to read and update all RFID tags.  
We assume that every partner has limited knowledge of its local neighborhood in 
the whole supply chain. Namely, for all 1≤ i ≤N, partner Pi is aware of its subsequent peer 
Pi+1 and for all 1 ≤i ≤N, Pi is aware of its preceding peer Pi-1.  
We do not consider physical attacks on legitimate readers, tags or tag-item 
attachment and denial of service attacks in this supply chain.   
8.1.2 System Setup: 
We consider using protocol 4 with some modifications for this application as its 
more secure than the other proposed protocols. Master keys transmission between the 
 88 
partners is done using public key encryption. Let l be the maximum length of RFID tag’s 
ID. If partner Pi is the first to start the supply chain then master keys for all the tags are 
generated and stored. When the tags leave Pi facility, all the updated master keys and 
other data are transmitted to Pi+1.  
8.1.2.1 Tag Initialization: P1 is responsible for RFID tag initialization. The data 
pertaining to tag includes master key K and ID. If P1 is the starting point in the supply 
chain then P1 will generate a master key and assign this value to K in the tag. P1 will store 
the item serial number or EPC, to which the tag is supposed to attach, in the ID field. 
8.1.2.2 Database Initialization: Using protocol 4 for this application, we modify 
the database by adding field S in the database which is a binary bit. ‘s=1’ to mean that the 
corresponding RFID tag has been processed. Otherwise we set it to 0. 
K Klast ID S 
Since P1 is the originator of the supply chain, it initializes D1 after setting up 
RFID tags. It will assign the value of the master key generated for that tag to field K, Klast 
will have the same value, EPC or serial number of item to field ID and s=0 and will do it 
for all the tags.  
Each partner Pi maintains a database Di in its local system. Di contains all RFID 
information with respect to that shipment. Each tuple in the database corresponds to a tag. 
For convenience, the j-th entry in the database, (kj, klastj , idj, sj), is denoted by dj. Di is 
represented by {d1, d2… dn}, where n is the number of tags for the current shipment. 
Initially, Di is empty.  
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To process the incoming material flow, Pi either receives or downloads all 
updated master Keys and ID of Di-1 from Pi-1 through a secure communication channel. Pi 
will set all the sj = 0, (1≤ j≤ n). 
8.1.2.3 RFID Read/Write Protocol: Our Protocol 4 works as follows in this case. 
Reader Protocol: The ultimate goal of this protocol for Pi‘s reader is to extract the 
tag’s ID and retrieve its corresponding record from the database. Our protocol described 
below shows the interaction between one tag and a reader.  
Step 1: Reader → Tag: The reader sends message ‘hello’ to the tag.  
Step 2: Tag → Reader: Tag generates n1, n2, then create message α using master key and 
sends α to the reader.  
Step 3: Tag Authentication: Using the master key K and Klast, the reader computes all 
possible responses for all unmarked tags in the database Di. Then the reader searches 
from the computation results. If match is found, it sets s=1, which means it’s a legitimate 
tag being present in the database and it’s being processed.  
Step 4: Used in Write Protocol.(see below) 
Step 5: Used in Write Protocol. 
Step 6: Reader Authentication: Using the new master key, the tag computes the response. 
If the response is the same as the message β, it authenticates the reader. 
Step 7: Used in Write Protocol. 
Step 8: Tag → Reader: Tag creates message γ and sends it to reader, which includes the 
ID of the item.    
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Write Protocol: The write process is to update the tag’s master key so that it can 
be accessed securely by the authorized readers of the next partner Pi+1. In essence, the 
reader of Pi writes Ki+1 to an RFID tag. The protocol is as follows: 
Step 4: Update Reader: New master key is generated using the old master key.  
Step 5: Reader → Tag: Reader generates n3, n4, then creates message β using the master 
key and sends β to the tag.  
Step 7: Update Tag: New master key is generated using the old master key.  
8.1.3 Security Requirements in Supply Chain: 
8.1.3.1 Visibility: In a supply chain, tracking of RFID tags should be provided. It 
should also provide the information about the last partner who has processed it. It allows 
the partners to track and monitor the progress of material flow without inefficient bar 
code scanning. While the supply chain partners are trusted and should be provided with 
supply chain visibility, however unauthorized readers should be prevented from 
understanding any tag’s content and from tracking the movement of material flow. The 
following can be concluded from the above protocol. 
• Without knowledge of the master key, no reader is able to obtain the tag’s 
identity. 
• Without knowledge of the master key, no reader is able to determine whether two 
tags belong to the same material flow.   
8.1.3.2 Authoritative Access: RFID tags are only accessible by authorized readers of 
partners Pi. Only authorized readers are able to interpret the responses and extract their 
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identities, whereas a malicious reader obtains no meaningful information from its 
interrogation. We summarize the security with respect to authoritative access in the 
following statement. 
• Consider an RFID tag delivered by partner Pi-1 to partner Pi. Only Pi’s reader is 
able to read the tag’s ID. Furthermore, only Pi’s reader is able to write to this tag.  
8.1.3.2 Authenticity of Tags: Only legitimate RFID tags delivered by Pi-1 will be 
accepted by Pi readers eliminating the replay and cloning attacks. Note that the supply 
chain reader is unable to distinguish between the original tag and a cloned malicious tag. 
The authenticity of tags in our protocol is summarized in the following statement. 
• It is computationally infeasible for an attacker, without the knowledge of a master 
key, to find out a pair n1 and n2 to make a valid message α. 
8.1.3.4 Unlinkablility: It should be unfeasible for the rouge reader to determine 
whether its interrogations are upon the same tag in inbound and outbound flow. In supply 
chain, a correlation of inbound flow and outbound flow reveals critical information about 
the company. Following can be concluded from the above protocol. 
• Given a response t1 from a tag prior to being processed by partner Pi and a 
response t2 from a tag after being processed by Pi, it is unfeasible for a rouge 
reader to determine whether t1 and t2 are from the same tag. In other words, the 





CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 In this thesis we have investigated the security issues and requirements of RFID 
systems, and have proposed Ultra-Light weight (Protocol 1, Protocol 2, and Protocol 3) 
and Light weight (Protocol 4, Protocol5) protocols. From the security and performance 
analysis done in the previous chapters we come up with the following conclusions. 
1. Ultra-Light weight protocols using primitive operations and pseudo-random 
number generator (PRNG) can provide the same level of security and 
performance without the use of expensive hash functions, symmetric encryption, 
and at much reduced cost.  
2. Ultra-Light weight protocols are highly robust. In ultra-light weight protocols, use 
of tag-index number (TIN) reduces the time complexity for identifying the tags in 
the database.  
3. In Light weight protocols, storing the previous value of shared key prevents the 
desynchronization problem. 
4. Light weight protocols using pseudo-random functions (PRF) can provide the 
same level of security with the exception of total tag anonymity and data recovery 
at much reduced cost.   
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The protocol suite proposed in this thesis can work as efficiently and it’s as secure 
as proposed by other people and fits the low-cost RFID system environment. 
These protocols can be used for item level tagging depending on the environment. 
Ultra-Lightweight protocols can easily work in a controlled environment without the 
presence of an active attacker. Since these protocols are cheap to implement and they 
don’t suffer from the scalability problem, they are best in such environment. These 
protocols can easily prevent eavesdropper and other attacks as shown. Light-weight 
protocols can be used in an environment where an active attacker is present. They can 
provide security for the item, however anonymity is partially fulfilled.  
In the proposed protocols, we were only able to provide partial anonymity. Total 
anonymity can be added to these protocols at the cost of a random number generator on 
the tag side, as the response from tag is always the same in our case, which can increase 
the price of a tag. Total anonymity is left for future work. 
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computing technology with numerous applications. Current low-cost RFID tags are 
highly resource-constrained and cannot support complex security mechanisms. Hence 
they have potential risks and may violate the privacy of their bearers.  The challenge in 
providing security for low-cost RFID tags lies in that they are computationally weak 
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